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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the 1969 codification of Internal Revenue Code section 385,
1
 
much litigation has turned on the issue of whether a cash advance from 
the shareholders of a closely-held corporation to the corporation itself 
should be characterized as debt or equity for the corporation’s federal 
income tax purposes.
2
  For instance, Corporation XYZ is formed by 
Shareholders A and B, who are individuals each owning 50 percent of 
issued common stock.  Immediately after the formation of the 
corporation, Shareholders A and B advance cash to the corporation for 
which they receive promissory notes.  Here, the issue is whether the cash 
advance should be characterized as debt or equity for Corporation XYZ’s 
federal income tax purposes. 
These hypothetical facts mirror the facts of the Third Circuit’s 1968 
leading case, Fin Hay Realty Co. v. United States.
3
  Importantly, Fin Hay 
Realty listed sixteen factors—many of which courts use—to determine 
whether such a cash advance is debt or equity.
4
  One factor considered is 
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 1.   I.R.C. § 385 (2012).   
 2.   See infra Part II.B. 
 3.   Fin Hay Realty Co. v. United States, 398 F.2d 694 (3d Cir. 1968). 
 4.   Id. at 696.  The factors include:  
(1) the intent of the parties; (2) the identity between creditors and shareholders; (3) the 
extent of participation in management by the holder of the instrument; (4) the ability of 
the corporation to obtain funds from outside sources; (5) the “thinness” of the capital 
structure in relation to debt; (6) the risk involved; (7) the formal indicia of the 
arrangement; (8) the relative position of the obligees as to other creditors regarding the 
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the “thinness” of the corporation’s capital structure in relation to debt.
5
  
Because no one factor is dispositive, litigation since Fin Hay Realty has 
produced uncertainty and inconsistency on this issue,
6
 resulting in 
increased levels of subjectivity on the part of the courts.
7
  Congress and 
the Department of the Treasury, moreover, have provided little 
guidance.
8
  This confusion and lack of guidance is significant.  For many 
corporations, millions of dollars are at stake because the Internal 
Revenue Service may re-characterize purported debt as equity, thus 
disallowing interest deductions
9
 and forcing double taxation of 
corporations’ profits at the corporate level and the shareholder level.
10
 
                                                          
payment of interest and principal; (9) the voting power of the holder of the instrument; 
(10) the provision of a fixed rate of interest; (11) a contingency on the obligation to 
repay; (12) the source of the interest payments; (13) the presence or absence of a fixed 
maturity date; (14) a provision for redemption by the corporation; (15) a provision for 
redemption at the option of the holder; and (16) the timing of the advance with reference 
to the organization of the corporation.   
Id. 
 5.   Id.  
 6.   See Willard B. Taylor et al., Three Views on Withdrawal of the Section 385 Regs., 20 TAX 
NOTES 495 (1983) (“The classification of interest in a corporation as debt or equity has been . . . an 
important source of litigation and uncertainty in the tax law.”).  See also ROBERT J. PERONI & 
STEVEN A. BANK, TAXATION OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISES: CASES AND MATERIALS 157 (4th ed. 
2012) (asserting that the Internal Revenue Code’s rules for the characterization of debt and equity 
are “unsatisfactorily vague and uncertain”); Katherine Pratt, The Debt-Equity Distinction in a 
Second-Best World, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1087–88 (2000).  
The debt-equity distinction causes numerous problems including complexity, uncertainty, 
and opportunities for tax arbitrage.  Tax lawyers devote significant time to camouflaging 
equity-like instruments to resemble debt for tax purposes.  Uncertainty about the tax 
consequences of innovative debt-equity hybrid securities inhibits the creation and sale of 
such securities.  The inconsistent tax treatment of equivalent cash flows with different 
labels permits taxpayers to reap tax profits from paper transactions that otherwise 
produce no economic gain or loss.  The debt-equity distinction thus distorts behavior. 
Id. 
 7.   Margaret A. Gibson, Comment, The Intractable Debt/Equity Problem: A New Structure 
for Analyzing Shareholder Advances, 81 NW. U.L. REV. 452, 453–54 (1987) (“The courts 
themselves have recognized that their standards are largely subjective, [and] that the rule of stare 
decisis has eroded in this area . . . .”).   
 8.   See Jeffrey D. Eicher & Leo N. Hitt, Section 385: Debt by Any Other Name . . ., 65 TAX 
NOTES 1033 (1994) (asserting that courts have “struggled without guidance to answer the 
debt/equity issue”).  
 9.   Kristina Dautrich Reynolds, Intercompany Debt—Is It Even Debt?, ALVAREZ & MARSAL: 
TAX ADVISOR WKLY. (Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.alvarezandmarsal.com/intercompany-debt-it-even-
debt2.   
 10.   See PERONI & BANK, supra note 6, at 192–93, 196 (describing double taxation of corporate 
profits by noting: (1) the distribution of corporate profits is not deductible, thus preserving 
corporate-level tax; and (2) under section 1(h)(11), shareholders are taxed on the distribution of 
profits in the form of a dividend, which is a “distribution of property made by a corporation to its 
shareholders . . . out of its earnings and profits” under section 316, at the same rate of tax that applies 
to long-term capital gains).   
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Courts have looked to many factors to determine whether a cash 
advance is debt or equity.
11
  However, the ultimate inquiry is whether the 
corporation-shareholder transaction has the economic reality of a debtor-
creditor relationship.
12
  Courts measure economic reality by determining 
“whether the transaction would have taken the same form had it been 
between the corporation and an outside lender.”
13
  To determine if they 
will enter transactions, outside lenders primarily consider the risk 
associated with the borrowing corporation, measured by the 
corporation’s “thinness” of capital structure and debt-to-equity ratio.
14
 
Because the tax characterization of a cash advance is an issue of 
economic reality exemplified by the “thinness” of capital structure of the 
corporation,
15
 the Secretary of the Treasury should prescribe regulations 
under section 385 to establish guidance for thin capitalization.  The 
proposed regulations should define thin capitalization as a principal 
factor in the analysis.  In addition, because thin capitalization is most 
objectively exemplified by the debt-to-equity ratio, the proposed 
regulations should define the calculation of the debt-to-equity ratio using 
the fair market value of the corporation’s liabilities and shareholders’ 
equity. 
Part II of this Comment examines the legislative, regulatory, and 
case law history of the debt versus equity inquiry.  Part III argues that the 
“thinness” of capital structure of the closely-held corporation is a 
                                                          
 11.   See, e.g., Estate of Mixon v. United States, 464 F.2d 394, 402 (5th Cir. 1972) (using a 
thirteen-factor test); Delta Plastics, Inc. v. Comm’r, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 940, 943 (2003) (using a ten-
factor test).  See also Dixie Dairies Corp. v. Comm’r, 74 T.C. 476, 493 (1980) (describing factors 
considered by other courts); A.R. Lantz Co. v. United States, 424 F.2d 1330, 1333 (9th Cir. 1970) 
(using an eleven-factor test). 
 12.   See Litton Bus. Sys., Inc. v. Comm’r, 61 T.C. 367, 377 (1973).  See also Smithco Eng’g, 
Inc. v. Comm’r, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 966, 969 (1984) (“[T]he ultimate question . . . is whether there 
was a genuine intent to create a debt, with a reasonable expectation of repayment, and whether that 
intention comports with the economic reality of a debtor-creditor relationship.” (citing Litton, 61 
T.C. at 377)). 
 13.   Scriptomatic, Inc. v. United States, 555 F.2d 364, 367 (3d Cir. 1977), aff’g 397 F. Supp. 
753 (E.D. Pa. 1975).   
 14.   See Bauer v. Comm’r, 748 F.2d 1365, 1369 (9th Cir. 1984) (“The purpose of examining 
the debt-to-equity ratio in characterizing a stockholder advance is to determine whether a 
corporation is so thinly capitalized that a business loss would result in an inability to repay the 
advance; such an advance would be indicative of venture capital rather than a loan.” (citing Gilbert 
v. Comm’r, 248 F.2d 399, 407 (2d Cir. 1957))).  See also WILLIAM J. CARNEY, CORPORATE 
FINANCE: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 51 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 3d ed. 2015) (“[Financial 
leverage ratios] are employed by creditors in analyzing whether to extend credit to an enterprise, and 
by attorneys drafting bond indentures, to provide bondholders with reasonable safeguards.”); id. at 
55 (describing the debt-to-equity ratio as a financial leverage ratio “used a great deal to describe the 
leverage of a firm”).  
 15.   See supra text accompanying notes 11–14.  
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principal factor in the debt versus equity analysis.  In addition, Part III 
argues that the Secretary of the Treasury should propose regulations 
regarding the calculation of the debt-to-equity ratio to provide more 
objective guidance to corporate taxpayers.  Finally, Part III considers the 
beneficial effects of proposing regulations under section 385. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Background of Debt Versus Equity Characterization 
1. Tax Implications of Debt or Equity Characterization for Corporate 
Financing 
In forming capital structures, corporations can finance operations by 
issuing either debt or equity capital.
16
  While neither the Internal 
Revenue Code (the Code) nor Treasury regulations contain express 
definitions of debt and equity,
17
 courts define debt as “an unqualified 
obligation to pay a sum certain at a reasonably close fixed maturity date 
along with a fixed percentage in interest payable regardless of the 
debtor’s income or lack thereof.”
18
  In contrast, courts define equity as an 
instrument held by a corporation’s shareholder, “who seeks to make an 
investment and to share in the profits and risks of loss in the venture.”
19
  
Thus, the corporation issues debt to creditors in exchange for cash or 
other property and pays interest to creditors over the term of the debt 
instrument.
20
  Alternatively, the corporation issues stock to shareholders 
and pays dividends to shareholders in return for their investment.
21
 
                                                          
 16.   Pratt, supra note 6, at 1059.  See also PERONI & BANK, supra note 6, at 154–55 (“A 
corporation’s capital structure consists of the securities issued by the corporation in exchange for the 
cash or other property or services contributed, or to be contributed, to it.  The classic components of 
a capital structure include stock, which is understood to represent the ownership, or equity, interest 
in the corporation, and debt, which reflects a creditor interest . . . .”) (emphasis added).   
 17.   PERONI & BANK, supra note 6, at 158 (“There is presently no definition in the Code or the 
regulations which can be used to determine whether an interest in a corporation constitutes debt or 
equity for tax purposes.  Such a determination must be made under principles developed in case 
law.”).   
 18.   Gilbert v. Comm’r, 248 F.2d 399, 402 (2d Cir. 1957). 
 19.   Bauer, 748 F.2d at 1367 (citing A.R. Lantz Co. v. United States, 424 F.2d 1330, 1334 (9th 
Cir. 1970)).  See also William T. Plumb, Jr., The Federal Income Tax Significance of Corporate 
Debt: A Critical Analysis and a Proposal, 26 TAX L. REV. 369, 404 (1970) (“[The shareholder] takes 
the risk, and profits from success.”).  
 20.   Pratt, supra note 6, at 1059–60.  See also PERONI & BANK, supra note 6, at 155–56 
(discussing the various extensions of credit to a corporation). 
 21.   Pratt, supra note 6, at 1059–60.  In the event of bankruptcy, the holder of the debt 
instrument “would regain his investment in liquidation as a creditor of the corporation before the 
equity holders would receive any of their investment.”  Meredith R. Conway, With or Without You: 
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Whether a cash advance is characterized as debt or equity has critical 
tax implications.  The Code imposes federal income tax on most U.S. 
corporations with few exceptions.
22
  The Code provides different tax 
treatment of debt and equity in several contexts.
23
  However, the 
deductibility of interest from bona fide indebtedness is the main reason 
corporate taxpayers and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) focus on 
debt versus equity questions.
24
  The Code allows a corporation to take a 
tax deduction for “all interest paid or accrued . . . on indebtedness.”
25
  
Yet, the Code does not contain a similar deduction for dividends that 
corporations pay to shareholders for their equity investments.
26
  
Therefore, corporate earnings are taxed at both the corporate entity level 
(via corporate taxable income) and the individual shareholder level (via 
shareholder dividend income), resulting in double taxation.
27
 
                                                          
Debt and Equity and Continuity of Interest, 15 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 261, 291 (2010) (comparing 
and contrasting aspects of traditional debt with traditional equity).  See also PERONI & BANK, supra 
note 6, at 155 (“Common stock represents the residual interest in the corporation.  Thus, the 
common stockholders are entitled to all of the corporate profits and increase in value . . . .”).  
 22.   I.R.C. § 11 (2012).  This Comment’s scope refers to closely-held “C” corporations, which 
are subject to United States federal income tax.  A “C” corporation is a “corporation which is not an 
S corporation for such year.”  I.R.C. § 1361(a)(2).  An “S” corporation is “a small business 
corporation for which an election under section 1362(a) is in effect for such year.”  I.R.C. § 
1361(a)(1).  As a result of the election under section 1362(a), an S corporation is not subject to 
corporate income tax.  See I.R.C. § 1363(a).  To be eligible for this exception from corporate income 
tax, the corporation must be domestic and must not: “(A) have more than 100 shareholders, (B) have 
as a shareholder a person . . . [subject to few exceptions] who is not an individual, (C) have a 
nonresident alien as a shareholder, and (D) have more than 1 class of stock.”  I.R.C. § 
1361(b)(1)(A)–(D).  
 23.   These contexts include the bad debt deduction and worthless stock capital loss.  First, debt 
versus equity classification is important to proving a creditor-taxpayer’s bad debt deduction under 
section 166, which provides that a deduction shall be allowed for “any debt which becomes 
worthless within the taxable year.”  I.R.C. § 166(a)(1).  To be entitled to the deduction, the taxpayer 
must prove a bona fide debt, which “arises from a debtor-creditor relationship based upon a valid 
and enforceable obligation to pay a fixed or determinable sum of money.”  Treas. Reg. § 1.166-1(c) 
(as amended in 1986).  See also Calumet Indus., Inc. v. Comm’r, 95 T.C. 257, 284 (1990).  Second, 
debt versus equity classification is important to establishing a creditor-taxpayer’s worthless stock 
capital loss under section 165(g), which states that the loss from a worthless security which is a 
capital asset shall “be treated as a loss from the sale or exchange . . . of a capital asset.”  I.R.C. § 
165(g)(1).  Thus, “worthless stock is treated as a capital loss” because corporate stock is generally 
treated as a “capital asset” as defined in section 1221.  See Lane v. United States, No. 80-G-1442-S, 
1983 WL 1636, at *1 (N.D. Ala. July 6, 1983), aff’d, 742 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1984).  See also 
William B. Barker, A Common Sense Corporate Tax: The Case for a Destination-Based, Cash Flow 
Tax on Corporations, 61 CATH. U.L. REV. 955, 964 (2012) (“[T]he disparate treatment of debt and 
equity remains one of the most important features of corporate taxation.”).  
 24.   Thomas D. Greenaway & Michelle L. Marion, A Simpler Debt-Equity Test, 66 TAX LAW. 
73, 75 (2012).  
 25.   I.R.C. § 163(a).  
 26.   See I.R.C. §§ 162, 301–18. 
 27.   See supra text accompanying note 10.  See also David P. Hariton, Distinguishing Between 
Equity and Debt in the New Financial Environment, 49 TAX L. REV. 499, 499 (1994) (asserting that 
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Because a deduction is allowed for interest paid or accrued on 
indebtedness, “debt is usually preferable to stock” in a corporation’s 
capital structure due to tax savings.
28
  For the corporation, the amount of 
tax savings is the amount of the interest deduction multiplied by the 
issuing corporation’s tax rate.
29
  For the individual shareholder, the 
amount of interest received is taxable as gross income at the 
shareholder’s ordinary income rate.
30
  However, if the IRS re-
characterizes purported debt into equity, then the distribution will be 
treated as a dividend with no associated deduction for the corporation.  
For the individual shareholder receiving qualified dividend income from 
the corporation, the tax rate is lowered from the ordinary income rate—
as high as 39.6 percent in 2015—to the long-term capital gain rate—
either 0, 15, or 20 percent.
31
  While this tax rate reduction for individual 
                                                          
double taxation is “the greatest anomaly of the U.S. tax system”); PERONI & BANK, supra note 6, at 
156 (“[O]n balance there is normally a significant bias in favor of the use of debt rather than equity.  
Corporate profits distributed on stock are subject to the double tax imposed upon corporations in this 
country . . . .  On the other hand, earnings distributed on debt avoid the double tax.”).   
 28.   Roger P. Becker, Classification of an Interest in a Corporation as Stock or Indebtedness—
New Regulations to Internal Revenue Code Section 385, 29 U. KAN. L. REV. 213, 217 (1981).  See 
also Barker, supra note 23, at 965–66 (“[T]he combination of tax incentives and debt financing 
produces a substantial government subsidy to corporations.”).  William Plumb, Jr. suggested that 
U.S. corporate tax law should treat debt and equity in a similar way for tax purposes to eliminate the 
disparate impact between the interest deduction and double taxation of corporate dividends.  See 
Plumb, supra note 19, at 398–404 (suggesting tax treatment of interest as nondeductible expense, or 
dividends as deductible expense).  See also Robert H. Scarborough, How Derivatives Use Affects 
Double Taxation of Corporate Income, 55 TAX L. REV. 465, 480–81 (2002). 
Increasing the ratio of debt to equity increases the value of the firm by reducing the 
burden of the corporate tax, but only up to the point at which the increased expected costs 
of financial distress resulting from increased leverage outweigh this benefit.  The more 
debt a corporation issues, and thus the greater the benefit of the tax shield, the more it is 
worth—but only up to a point.  At some point the increased expected costs of financial 
distress from replacing equity with debt begin to outweigh the tax benefits of increased 
leverage.  Thus, the choice of optimal capital structure is widely seen as requiring a trade-
off of tax benefits against expected bankruptcy risk. 
Id. (footnote omitted).   
 29.   See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO TAX 
TREATMENT OF BUSINESS DEBT 64 (2011) [hereinafter JCT], http://waysandmeans.house.gov/ 
UploadedFiles/Barthold_Testimony_Business_Debt_7.13.pdf.   
 30.   I.R.C. § 61(a)(4).  In addition to the ordinary income rate, individual taxpayers may be 
subject to an additional 3.8 percent tax imposed on net investment income, including interest 
income, if the taxpayer exceeds a certain threshold based upon adjusted gross income.  See I.R.C. § 
1411. 
 31.   I.R.C. § 1(h)(11)(B).  Section 1(h)(11) reduced the tax rate for qualified dividend 
income—defined as “dividends received during the taxable year from (I) domestic corporations, and 
(II) qualified foreign corporations”—to the long-term capital gain rate.  For individual taxpayers in 
the 10 or 15-percent tax brackets, the qualified dividend income tax rate is 0 percent.  I.R.C. § 
1(h)(1)(B), (11)(A).  For individual taxpayers in the 25, 28, 33, or 35-percent tax brackets, the 
qualified dividend income tax rate is 15 percent.  I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(C), (11)(A).  For individual 
taxpayers in the 39.6 percent tax bracket, the qualified dividend income tax rate is 20 percent.  I.R.C. 
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shareholders may diminish the disadvantage of double taxation, there is 
still incentive to avoid payment of dividends to individual shareholders 
because “corporate profits remain more heavily taxed overall than are 
other forms of income.”
32
  In contrast, for the corporate shareholder 
receiving dividend income, the Code grants a special deduction.
33
  If the 
corporate shareholder owns more than 80 percent of the voting power 
and value of stock of a domestic corporation and is, thus, a member of 
the same affiliated group as the corporation, the corporate shareholder is 
granted a deduction for the full amount of dividends received.
34
 
While the Code grants a deduction for interest on debt, it also 
imposes limits on this deduction.
35
  For instance, section 163(j) provides 
that interest paid by a corporation to a related tax-exempt or foreign 
entity is not deductible if: (1) the corporation has a debt-to-equity ratio as 
of the close of the year in excess of 1.5 to 1; and (2) the corporation’s net 
interest expense is greater than 50 percent of its adjusted taxable 
income.
36
  Further, Code regulations do not allow a deduction for 
“[i]nterest calculated for . . . purposes on account of capital or surplus 




Because the interest deduction is so attractive to the corporate 
taxpayer, courts have closely examined cash advances between a parent 
                                                          
§ 1(h)(1)(D), (11)(A).  Section 1(h)(11) was implemented in 2003.  See Jobs and Growth Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108–27, § 302, 117 Stat. 752, 760–64 (2003).  In addition to 
the long-term capital gain rate, the individual taxpayer may be subject to an additional 3.8 percent 
tax imposed on net investment income, including dividend income, if the taxpayer exceeds a certain 
threshold based upon adjusted gross income.  See I.R.C. § 1411.   
 32.   PERONI & BANK, supra note 6, at 193–94.  
 33.   See I.R.C. § 243. 
 34.   I.R.C. §§ 243(a)(3)–(b), 1504(a).  If the corporate shareholder owns between 20 and 80 
percent of the stock of the corporation (by vote and value), then the corporate shareholder is granted 
deduction of 80 percent of the dividends received.  I.R.C. § 243(a)(1), (c).  If the corporate 
shareholder owns less than 20 percent of the stock of the corporation (by vote and value), then the 
corporate shareholder is granted a deduction of 70 percent of the dividends received.  I.R.C. § 
243(a)(1). 
 35.   See Scarborough, supra note 28, at 490 (“[T]he tax law places limits on a corporation’s 
ability to replace equity with conventional (that is, noncontingent, full-recourse) debt to minimize 
double taxation of corporate income.”).   
 36.   I.R.C. § 163(j).  Section 163(j) applies to a narrow subset of U.S. taxpayers who do not 
meet the statutory safe harbor with a debt-to-equity ratio of 1.5 to 1, pay “disqualified interest,” and 
have “excess interest expense.”  See id.  This Comment applies to a wider scope of taxpayers 
covered by section 385.  As another example of where the Code limits the deductibility of interest, 
section 163(e)(5) denies full deductibility for original issue discount on debt instruments if (1) the 
instrument has a yield that exceeds the applicable federal rate plus 5 percentage points; (2) the 
instrument has a term of more than five years; and (3) as of the end of the fifth year more than one 
year of original issue discount is deferred.  I.R.C. § 163(e)(5), (i). 
 37.   Treas. Reg. § 1.163-1(c) (as amended in 1976). 
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corporation (acting as a shareholder) and a subsidiary corporation.
38
  The 
parent’s control over the subsidiary poses an opportunity to create 
“fictional debt.”
39
  Courts emphasize the importance of an ongoing 
debtor-creditor relationship in determining whether to allow an interest 
deduction.
40
  In addition, courts focus on objective evidence—such as 
payment terms and a maturity date on the debt instrument—to determine 




2. Debt Versus Equity Characterization in Corporate Financial Markets 
Early case law regarding debt versus equity characterizations 
“developed . . . in a relatively static financial environment”
42
 where 
financial instruments were more easily identified as debt or equity than 
they are today.  While the debt versus equity issue generally arose in the 
context of small, closely-held corporations like the corporation in Fin 
Hay Realty,
43
 the issue has transformed in response to changes in 
financial markets.  Newer financial instruments, such as convertible debt 
and preferred stock, have features of both debt and equity and thus cause 
increased complexity for the debt versus equity distinction.
44
  Moreover, 
                                                          
 38.   See, e.g., Racal Elecs., Inc. v. Comm’r, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 756, 764–65 (1990).   
 39.   See Gilboy v. Comm’r, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 510, 515 (1978) (asserting that advances to a 
closely held corporation by its shareholders are subject to particular scrutiny because the “absence of 
arm’s-length dealing provides the opportunity to contrive a fictional debt shielding the real essence 
of the transaction and obtaining benefits unintended by the statute”). 
 40.   See Green Leaf Ventures, Inc. v. Comm’r, 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 2342, 2350–51 (1995) 
(asserting that the interest deduction “ceases to be a real cost if with the passage of time it becomes 
apparent that the parties have no intention of continuing the debtor-creditor relationship”).  See also 
Cuyuna Realty Co. v. United States, 382 F.2d 298, 301–02 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (“[T]he character of 
indebtedness may vanish when the parent and the subsidiary cease acting like debtors and 
creditors . . . .”). 
 41.   See Indmar Prods. Co. v. Comm’r, 444 F.3d 771, 780 (6th Cir. 2006) (asserting that the 
desire to avoid taxes acts “as a flag to the Commissioner and courts to look closely at the transaction 
for any objective indicia of debt”).  See also H & M, Inc. v. Comm’r, 104 T.C.M. (CCH) 452, 458–
60 (2012) (characterizing a cash advance as equity where the promissory note included neither 
payment terms nor a maturity date). 
 42.   Hariton, supra note 27, at 500. 
 43.   Fin Hay Realty Co. v. United States, 398 F.2d 694, 695 (3d Cir. 1968). 
 44.   See Discussion Memorandum, An Analysis of Issues Related to Distinguishing between 
Liability and Equity Instruments and Accounting for Instruments with Characteristics of Both, 94 
FIN. ACCT. SERIES 1, 2 (1990) (“[D]ebt that is convertible at the election of the holder into common 
stock of the issuer combines characteristics of both a liability and an equity instrument . . . .  [S]ome 
issues of preferred stock have maturity amounts and dates at which the issuing enterprise must 
redeem them for cash.”).  See also Scarborough, supra note 28, at 528. 
Both the tax law and corporate finance theory traditionally have viewed corporate capital 
structure as made up of debt and equity.  This model breaks down when confronted with 
instruments that are not classified as equity for tax purposes, but reference the issuing 
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following the changes in the financial marketplace during the 1980s, 
several different types of financial instruments have arisen, including 
high yield debt, hybrid debt, and options.
45
 
In addition to different types of debt and equity instruments, 
leveraged buybacks of corporate stock increased during the 1980s as a 
way to replace equity with debt to utilize interest deductions.
46
  As a 
result, on average, corporate capital structures contained more debt and 
less equity.
47
  In the 1990s, derivative transactions increased in the 
financial marketplace, causing an added level of complexity to 
distinguishing between equity and debt.
48
 
Finally, an increase in international business has resulted in an 
increase in cash transfers from foreign parent entities to foreign-owned 
U.S. companies, which then claim a deduction for interest expense.
49
  For 
                                                          
corporation’s shares, earnings, or business risks.  Instruments in this third category 
include swaps, options, and forward contracts on a corporation’s own stock, earnings-
linked contingent debt, more traditional convertible debt, and derivatives used to shift 
specific business risks from the corporation to other parties. 
Id. 
 45.   Hariton, supra note 27, at 500.  For instance, high yield debt is “subordinated to other 
creditor interests,” so that in the case of bankruptcy, high yield debt holders are senior only to equity 
holders.  Pratt, supra note 6, at 1071.  Because of their low priority, high yield bondholders are 
promised a disproportionately high interest rate, which causes the high yield bonds to bear strong 
similarities with preferred stock, a type of equity security.  Id.  See also John Herbert Roth, 
Comment, The Disparate Treatment of Nonqualified Preferred Stock: Yet Another Tax Classification 
Nightmare?, 32 CUMB. L. REV. 605, 636 (2001–02) (“‘[D]ebt’ and ‘equity’ are labels for the two 
edges of a spectrum, between which lie an infinite number of investment instruments, each differing 
from its nearest neighbor in barely perceptible ways.” (quoting BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES S. 
EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS & SHAREHOLDERS § 4.02[1] (7th ed. 
2000))). 
 46.   See Eicher & Hitt, supra note 8 (“[T]he Tax Code was at least partially responsible for the 
acquisition and takeover frenzy of the 1980s, which relied heavily on leveraged transactions and the 
resulting interest expense deductions.”).  See also Scarborough, supra note 28, at 529 (“The 1980’s 
saw increased use of leveraged buy-backs of corporate stock as a way to replace equity with debt to 
reduce double taxation of corporate income.  Corporations used leveraged buy-backs of their stock 
as a form of self-help integration of the corporate and investor taxes.”).   
 47.   Pratt, supra note 6, at 1070 (“During the 1980s, public corporations began to issue 
significantly more debt.  This debt was frequently issued in exchange for outstanding stock of the 
corporation.  The result was that corporate capital structures, on average, included more debt and 
less equity.”). 
 48.   Hariton, supra note 27, at 500–01.  See also Scarborough, supra note 28, at 474 
(describing the following types of derivatives: forward contract on corporate shares, an equity swap 
referencing to corporate shares, and “derivative[s] referencing a market index that correlates with [a 
corporation’s] share price”). 
 49.   See Thomas A. Butera, Laidlaw: The Debt vs. Equity Classification Issue Resurfaces, 16 J. 
TAX’N INV. 185, 185 (1999) (“[M]oney is typically transferred from the foreign parent company, or 
one of its subsidiaries, to the U.S. subsidiary in a transaction characterized by the parties as 
indebtedness.”).  
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example, in Laidlaw Transportation, Inc. v. Commissioner,
50
 a Canadian 
parent company formed a Dutch subsidiary to transfer funds, in the form 
of debt, to a group of U.S. subsidiaries.
51
  Holding that the funds should 
be characterized as equity for U.S. federal income tax purposes, the Tax 
Court disallowed the U.S. subsidiaries’ significant tax deduction for 
interest expense in the amount of $133 million.
52
  Considering these 
changes in the financial marketplace, many of the traditional debt versus 
equity factors, discussed below, are no longer relevant to the analysis.
53
 
3. Legislative and Regulatory Background of the Debt Versus Equity 
Characterization 
The debt versus equity issue has a decades-long legislative and 
regulatory history, the apex of which was Congress’s 1969 enactment of 
Code section 385.
54
  The 1969 enactment authorized the Treasury to 
prescribe regulations defining corporate stock and debt for U.S. federal 
income tax purposes.
55
  The Senate Report noted the difficulty of 
enacting comprehensive and specific statutory rules to distinguish 
between debt and equity.
56
  The statute itself defers to the Secretary of 
the Treasury to promulgate guidelines.
57
 
Section 385(b) states that “[t]he regulations prescribed under this 
section shall set forth factors which are to be taken into account in 
determining with respect to a particular factual situation whether a 
debtor-creditor relationship exists or a corporation-shareholder 
relationship exists.”
58
  Section 385(b) contains five factors that the 
Secretary “may include” in establishing regulations: 
                                                          
 50.   Laidlaw Transp., Inc. v. Comm’r, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 2598 (1998).  
 51.   See id. at 2598–99, 2602–03.   
 52.   Id. at 2598–99, 2624.   
 53.   See Greenaway & Marion, supra note 24, at 80 (“[T]he old debt-equity factors are 
vulnerable to criticism for being unsuitable for distinguishing debt from equity in today’s world 
given changes in structured finance.”).   
 54.   See I.R.C. § 385 (2012).   
 55.   See id.  Prior to this enactment, the House Report on the 1954 Code attempted to 
distinguish between stock and debt by defining the terms “participating stock,” “nonparticipating 
stock,” and “securities.”  See H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, at 4061 (1954).  However, the Senate observed 
that any attempt to write statutory definitions for corporate stocks and securities for tax purposes 
would be frustrated by the interchangeable characteristics that can be given to these instruments.  See 
S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 4672–73 (1954). 
 56.   See S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 2034 (1969).   
 57.   See id.; I.R.C. § 385(a) (“The Secretary is authorized to prescribe such regulations as may 
be necessary or appropriate to determine whether an interest in a corporation is to be treated for 
purposes of this title as stock or indebtedness . . . .”).   
 58.   I.R.C. § 385(b). 
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1. whether there is a written unconditional promise to pay on demand 
or on a specified date a sum certain in money in return for an adequate 
consideration in money or money’s worth, and to pay a fixed rate of 
interest, 
2. whether there is subordination to or preference over any 
indebtedness of the corporation, 
3.  the ratio of debt to equity of the corporation, 
4.  whether there is convertibility into the stock of the corporation, and 
5.  the relationship between holdings of stock in the corporation and 
holdings of the interest in question.
59
 
Notably, one of the five factors is the debt-to-equity ratio, a concept 
that gained more attention when the Treasury proposed regulations under 
section 385 on March 24, 1980.
60
  The Treasury provided for an 
objective debt-to-equity ratio by proposing: “[A] corporation’s debt is 
not excessive if . . . [t]he corporation’s outside ratio is less than or equal 
to 10:1, and . . . [t]he corporation’s inside ratio is less than or equal to 
3:1.”
61
  The term outside ratio refers to “the ratio that the liabilities, 
excluding trade accounts payable and other accrued payables, bear to the 
stockholders’ equity.”
62
  In contrast, the term inside ratio refers to the 
ratio of liabilities—excluding trade accounts payable, other accrued 




The proposed regulations also included provisions for the calculation 
of the debt-to-equity ratio, which had been an area of dispute.
64
  In the 
calculation of both the outside and inside ratios, the proposed regulations 
disregarded trade accounts payable, accrued operating expenses, and 
similar items.
65
  The Treasury’s rationale was that trade accounts payable 
and accrued expenses vary widely during the year; consequently, if these 
figures were included in debt, “one of the principal purposes of the 
regulations, which is to provide a high degree of certainty for 
                                                          
 59.   I.R.C. § 385(b)(1)–(5) (emphasis added).  
 60.   See Eicher & Hitt, supra note 8 (providing a brief history of the proposed and withdrawn 
section 385 regulations). 
 61.   Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(g)(3), 47 Fed. Reg. 164, 182 (Jan. 5, 1982).  
 62.   Becker, supra note 28, at 228.  
 63.   Id.   
 64.   See Gibson, supra note 7, at 482 (noting that there is “great ambiguity” in determining the 
inputs into the debt-to-equity ratio).   
 65.   Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(h)(1)(i), 47 Fed. Reg. 164, 183 (Jan. 5, 1982).   
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corporations,” would be defeated.
66
 
Despite the Treasury’s efforts, the final regulations proved 
controversial for “being too anti-business,”
67
 and revised regulations 
were published on January 5, 1982.
68
  Subsequently, on July 6, 1983, the 
final regulations and proposed revisions were withdrawn; thus, the 
Treasury failed to enact regulations under section 385.
69
  In 1989, 
Congress amended section 385 to authorize the Treasury to issue 
regulations that would bifurcate instruments into equity and debt 
portions,
70
 but these regulations have not been issued.  In 1992, Congress 
amended section 385 by adding subsection (c), which binds the issuing 
taxpayer—but not the IRS—to the “characterization (as of the time of 
issuance) by the issuer as to whether an interest in a corporation is stock 
or indebtedness.”
71
  Since the enactment of section 385, the IRS has 




In April 1994, however, the IRS did issue Notice 94-47,
73
 one of few 
official notices providing guidance on the debt versus equity issue.  
Notice 94-47 was issued in response to transactions formed in such a 
way as to be treated as debt for federal income tax purposes but as equity 
                                                          
 66.   Supplementary Information to Proposed Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg. 18,957, 18,959 (Mar. 
24, 1980).  
 67.   Robert J. Misey Jr., An Unsatisfactory Response to the International Problem of Thin 
Capitalization: Can Regulations Save the Earnings Stripping Provision?, 8 INT’L TAX & BUS. LAW. 
171, 173 (1991).  See also PERONI & BANK, supra note 6, at 162–63 (noting the “flood of criticism” 
resulting from the regulations, and recognizing the odd outcome of the regulations’ approach to 
bifurcation (where the investment in the corporation is allocated between stock and debt), which 
reduced the principal amount of purported debt rather than the interest deduction).  
 68.   See Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.385-1 to 1.385-12, 45 Fed. Reg. 18,957 (Mar. 24, 1980), 
revised, 45 Fed. Reg. 86,438 (Dec. 31, 1980), revised and reproposed as Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.385-
0 to 1.385-8, 47 Fed. Reg. 164 (Jan. 5, 1982), withdrawn, 48 Fed. Reg. 31,053 (July 6, 1983). 
 69.   See Eicher & Hitt, supra note 8 (providing a brief history of the proposed and withdrawn 
section 385 regulations). 
 70.   Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101–239, § 7208, 103 Stat. 
2106, 2337 (1989).  Subsection (a) was amended by inserting “(or as in part stock and in part 
indebtedness)” at the end of the subsection, so the final language states: “The Secretary is authorized 
to prescribe such regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to determine whether an interest in 
a corporation is to be treated for purposes of this title as stock or indebtedness (or as in part stock 
and in part indebtedness).”  I.R.C. § 385(a) (2012).  
 71.   I.R.C. § 385(c).  See also Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102–486, § 1936, 106 
Stat. 2776, 3032 (1992) (amending § 385 by adding subsection (c), applicable “to instruments issued 
after the date of enactment”). 
 72.   For instance, in 1983, the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 83-98 regarding adjustable rate 
convertible notes (ARCNs).  The ruling takes the position that “the ARCNs were equity, not debt, 
because there was no debtor-creditor relationship between the issuer and the holders of the ARCNs.”  
Pratt, supra note 6, at 1082 (citing to Rev. Rul. 83-98, 1983-2 C.B. 40). 
 73.   I.R.S. Notice 94-47, 1994-1 C.B. 357.  
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for regulatory, rating agency, or financial accounting purposes.
74
  The 
Notice listed the following factors—including thin capitalization—that 
may be considered in making the determination of an instrument for 
federal income tax purposes: 
1. whether there is an unconditional promise on the part of the issuer to 
pay a sum certain on demand or at a fixed maturity date that is in the 
reasonably foreseeable future; 
2. whether holders of the instruments possess the right to enforce the 
payment of principal and interest; 
3. whether the rights of the holders of the instruments are subordinate 
to rights of general creditors; 
4. whether the instruments give the holders the right to participate in 
the management of the issuer; 
5. whether the issuer is thinly capitalized; 
6. whether there is identity between holders of the instruments and 
stockholders of the issuer; 
7. the label placed upon the instruments by the parties; and 
8. whether the instruments are intended to be treated as debt or equity 




Since the issuance of Notice 94-47, there have been no major 
regulatory debt versus equity developments.
76
  As a result, there is no 
comprehensive statutory or regulatory guidance on what makes a cash 
advance equity or debt.
77
 
B. Case Law of the Debt versus Equity Characterization 
1. Circuit Courts’ Various Approaches to Debt versus Equity 
Characterization 
Because Congress and the Treasury have not defined debt and equity, 
there is lack of uniformity regarding this issue among courts—even in 
                                                          
 74.   Id.  
 75.   Id. (emphasis added).   
 76.   Greenaway & Marion, supra note 24, at 79.  
 77.   Id.   
540 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 64 
cases where creditor-debtor relationships appear substantially similar.
78
  
Circuit courts have not settled on a single approach or list of factors to 
consider in answering the debt versus equity question.
79
  Although many 
of the circuit courts cite to the majority of the sixteen factors from Fin 
Hay Realty,
80
 the circuit courts have differing lists of factors to which 
they look to answer the debt versus equity inquiry.
81





 use an eleven-factor test.  The Fifth Circuit and 
Eleventh Circuit use a thirteen-factor test,
84
 and the Eighth Circuit uses a 
                                                          
 78.   Tyler v. Tomlinson, 414 F.2d 844, 847 (5th Cir. 1969) (asserting that the divergent case 
law regarding debt versus equity “has resulted in a lack of decisional uniformity even in cases where 
the individual creditor-debtor relationships exhibit ostensible similitude”). 
 79.   See Indmar Prods. Co. v. Comm’r, 444 F.3d 771, 776 (6th Cir. 2006).   
 80.   See Fin Hay Realty Co. v. United States, 398 F.2d 694, 696 (3d Cir. 1968).  See also supra 
note 4 and accompanying text.  
 81.   See infra notes 82–85 and accompanying text.  
 82.   See Roth Steel Tube Co. v. Comm’r, 800 F.2d 625, 630 (6th Cir. 1986) (noting no one 
factor of an eleven-factor test is dispositive and the test must be applied to “the particular 
circumstances of each case”).  The factors include:  
(1) the names given to the instruments, if any, evidencing the indebtedness; (2) the 
presence or absence of a fixed maturity date and schedule of payments; (3) the presence 
or absence of a fixed rate of interest and interest payments; (4) the source of repayments; 
(5) the adequacy or inadequacy of capitalization; (6) the identity of interest between the 
creditor and the stockholder; (7) the security, if any, for the advances; (8) the 
corporation’s ability to obtain financing from outside lending institutions; (9) the extent 
to which the advances were subordinated to the claims of outside creditors; (10) the 
extent to which the advances were used to acquire capital assets; and (11) the presence or 
absence of a sinking fund to provide repayments.   
Id. 
 83.   See Bauer v. Comm’r, 748 F.2d 1365, 1368 (9th Cir. 1984) (utilizing an eleven-factor 
test).  The factors include: 
(1) the names given to the certificates evidencing the indebtedness; (2) the presence or 
absence of a maturity date; (3) the source of the payments; (4) the right to enforce the 
payment of principal and interest; (5) participation in management; (6) a status equal to 
or inferior to that of regular corporate creditors; (7) the intent of the parties; (8) “thin” or 
adequate capitalization; (9) identity of interest between creditor and stockholder; (10) 
payment of interest only out of “dividend” money; and (11) the ability of the corporation 
to obtain loans from outside lending institutions.  
Id. (citing A.R. Lantz Co. v. United States, 424 F.2d 1330, 1333 (9th Cir. 1970)).   
 84.   See In re Lane, 742 F.2d 1311, 1314–15 (11th Cir. 1984) (noting the Eleventh and Fifth 
Circuits’ use of a thirteen-factor test to analyze debt versus equity treatment of a cash advance).  The 
factors are:  
(1) the names given to the certificates evidencing the indebtedness; (2) the presence or 
absence of a fixed maturity date; (3) the source of payments; (4) the right to enforce 
payment of principal and interest; (5) participation in management flowing as a result; (6) 
the status of the contribution in relation to regular corporate creditors; (7) the intent of the 
parties; (8) ‘thin’ or adequate capitalization; (9) identity of interest between creditor and 
stockholder; (10) source of interest payments; (11) the ability of the corporation to obtain 
loans from outside lending institutions; (12) the extent to which the advance was used to 
acquire capital assets; and (13) the failure of the debtor to repay on the due date or to seek 
a postponement.   
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ten-factor test.
85
  In the aggregate, courts have looked to as many as 
thirty-eight factors to distinguish debt from equity,
86
 with no one factor 
as dispositive.
87
  Consequently, with the debt versus equity issue comes a 
“lack of clarity, certainty, and logic in the judicial analysis”
88
 resulting in 
a lack of certainty in tax planning and little guidance for corporations in 
structuring transactions.
89
  Indeed, the Fifth Circuit stated in Tyler v. 
Tomlinson: “[T]his field of the law continues to defy symmetry.”
90
 
In Sun Properties, Inc. v. United States,
91
 with facts that arguably 
point to equity, the Fifth Circuit found that the sole shareholder of a 
corporation received valid debt in exchange for a warehouse.
92
  The facts 
supporting equity characterization were: the purported loan amount of 
$125,000 was not secured by a mortgage; the purported debt agreement 
did not provide for interest, but rather provided for the $125,000 to be 
paid off at $4,000 semiannually; and the corporation had nominal assets 




In Farley Realty Corp. v. Commissioner,
94
 the Second Circuit 
                                                          
Id. (quoting Estate of Mixon v. United States, 464 F.2d 394, 402 (5th Cir. 1972)). 
 85.   See J.S. Biritz Constr. Co. v. Comm’r, 387 F.2d 451, 457 (8th Cir. 1967) (using a ten-
factor test to analyze debt versus equity treatment of a cash advance).  The factors are: 
(1) Whether the corporation is so grossly under-capitalized that the loans are in fact 
needed for capital purposes and are actually intended to be risked capital rather than a 
loan. . . .  (2) Whether the purported loans were made in proportion to equity 
holdings. . . .  (3) Whether the repayment of the loan was predicated on the success of the 
venture.  (4) Whether there was a fixed date for payment of the note and a reasonable 
expectation of payment by that date.  (5) Whether the note was subordinated to other 
corporate debts.  (6) Whether third parties would have made the loan under the same 
conditions.  (7) Whether the claimed loan was secured by a mortgage or otherwise. (8) 
Whether a provision was made for a sinking fund to retire the loan. . . .  (9) Whether the 
person making the purported loan participated in the management of the corporation. . . . 
[And] (10) [w]hether the corporation had a large proportion of debt to equity.  
Id. (citations omitted). 
 86.   Robert S. Holzman, The Interest-Dividend Guidelines, 47 TAXES 4, 4 (1969).   
 87.   See John Kelley Co. v. Comm’r, 326 U.S. 521, 530 (1946) (“There is no one characteristic, 
not even exclusion from management, which can be said to be decisive in the determination of 
whether the obligations are risk investments in the corporations or debts.”).  See also Elec. Modules 
Corp. v. United States, 695 F.2d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (“[T]here is no single factor that is 
decisive on the issue.”); L. Howard Adams, What Role for Equity in Applying Factors for 
Distinguishing Debt?, 138 TAX NOTES 1095 (2013) (“Not even a majority of the factors pointing in 
the desired direction is needed, because the debt-equity factors are not equally weighted.”). 
 88.   Gibson, supra note 7, at 454. 
 89.   Id. at 465. 
 90.   Tyler v. Tomlinson, 414 F.2d 844, 847 (5th Cir. 1969).   
 91.   Sun Props., Inc. v. United States, 220 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1955). 
 92.   See id. at 175–76.   
 93.   See id. at 172.  
 94.   Farley Realty Corp. v. Comm’r, 279 F.2d 701 (2d Cir. 1960).   
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adopted the bifurcation approach
95
 that was later enacted by Congress in 
section 385 in 1989.
96
  Because the court determined that the 
shareholder’s equity interest was “separable” from his debt interest, the 
court bifurcated the instrument for federal income tax purposes.
97
  Thus, 
when the corporation liquidated, the $50,000 at issue represented the 
settlement of the right to share in the corporation’s financial success, 




Although case law lacks a consistent analysis of the debt versus 
equity factors, courts agree that “[a] payment for which a taxpayer seeks 
a deduction must have economic substance.”
99
  In other words, interest is 
only deductible when it results from a transaction that has a “purpose, 
substance or utility apart from [its] anticipated tax consequences.”
100
  
Accordingly, the substance—rather than the form—of a transaction 
controls its tax treatment.
101
  For instance, in Laidlaw Transportation, 
Inc. v. Commissioner,
102
 the Tax Court gave less weight to the debt 
versus equity factors relating to the form of the transaction, showing that 
labels like “debt” or “indenture” used for a transaction may signify little 
when the substance of the transaction supports equity characterization.
103
  
In Ramig v. Commissioner,
104
 the Tax Court held that cash advances 
were equity even though four factors pointed to equity investment and 
five factors pointed to debt.
105
  This holding shows that the debt versus 
equity inquiry is “no mere counting of factors.”
106
  Therefore, the various 
approaches of the circuit courts and the Tax Court indicate the lack of 
uniformity regarding the debt versus equity inquiry. 
                                                          
 95.   See id. at 704. 
 96.   See supra note 70 and accompanying text.  
 97.   See Farley, 279 F.2d at 704.   
 98.   See id.  
 99.   See Laidlaw Transp., Inc. v. Comm’r, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 2598, 2616 (1998) (citing 
Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 467 (1935); United States v. Wexler, 31 F.3d 117, 124 (3d Cir. 
1994); Krumhorn v. Comm’r, 103 T.C. 29, 48 (1994)). 
 100.   Wexler, 31 F.3d at 124 (quoting Goldstein v. Comm’r, 364 F.2d 734, 740 (2d Cir. 1966)).  
 101.   Laidlaw, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2616.  
 102.   Id. at 2598.  
 103.   See id. at 2617, 2624.   
 104.   Ramig v. Comm’r, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1695 (2011), aff’d, 496 F. App’x 756 (9th Cir. 
2012). 
 105.   Id. at 1700. 
 106.   Id. (citing Bauer v. Comm’r, 748 F.2d 1365, 1368 (9th Cir. 1984)).  
2015 THE DEBT VERSUS EQUITY DEBACLE 543 
2. Recent Cases on Debt versus Equity Characterization 
The Tax Court reported few debt versus equity cases from 2003 to 
2009.
107
  However, reporting of debt versus equity cases has become 
more common since 2010, likely due to a combination of factors.
108
  
These factors include the increase in IRS resources to work on debt 
versus equity cases, the notable growth in cross-border financing, and 
being a part of the “larger regulatory effort towards deleveraging the 
U.S. economy.”
109
  In 2012, three debt versus equity cases determined in 
the Tax Court show the high tax dollars at stake, as well as how the Tax 
Court has analyzed thin capitalization.
110
 
First, in Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Commissioner,
111
 the Tax Court held 
that the petitioner’s investment in a foreign corporation should be treated 
as debt.
112
  Accordingly, the petitioner was unable to deduct a 
$15,569,004 capital loss because capital losses result from investments in 
capital assets, not from debt.
113
  The Tax Court analyzed eleven factors to 
arrive at its holding.
114
  One of the factors was adequacy of 
capitalization.
115
  The court stated: “The purpose of examining the debt-
to-equity ratio in characterizing an advance is to determine whether a 
corporation is so thinly capitalized that it would be unable to repay an 
advance.  Such an advance would be indicative of venture capital rather 
                                                          
 107.   See Greenaway & Marion, supra note 24, at 93 n.147 (“The Tax Court reported six 
relatively small debt-equity cases in 2001.  The Tax Court reported four debt-equity cases in 2002.  
The court then averaged between only one or two reported debt-equity cases per year for the next 
seven years.”) (citations omitted).   
 108.   See id. at 93.   
 109.   See id. at 93–94, 99 (noting that since 2008 “the Service has worked large debt-equity 
cases with fervor” and “outbound interest payments without a corresponding income inclusion may 
present a systemic threat to the U.S. corporate tax base”).   
 110.   See generally Reynolds, supra note 9 (discussing three Tax Court cases from 2012 in 
which the main issue was debt versus equity characterization). 
 111.   Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Comm’r, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1736 (2012).  
 112.   Id. at 1737, 1753.   
 113.   See id. at 1753–54.   
 114.   Id. at 1747–48.  Specifically, the factors are:  
(1) the labels on the documents evidencing the alleged indebtedness; (2) the presence or 
absence of a maturity date; (3) the source of payments; (4) the right of the alleged lender 
to enforce payment; (5) participation in management; (6) a status equal to or inferior to 
that of regular corporate creditors; (7) the intent of the parties; (8) the adequacy of the 
(supposed) borrower’s capitalization; (9) whether stockholders’ advances to the 
corporation are in the same proportion as their equity ownership in the corporation; (10) 
the payment of interest out of only “dividend money”; and (11) the borrower’s ability to 
obtain loans from outside lenders.   
Id. at 1747 (citing A.R. Lantz Co. v. United States, 424 F.2d 1330, 1333 (9th Cir. 1970)). 
 115.   Id. at 1752–53.  
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than a loan.”
116
  Determining this factor favored debt characterization, 




Second, in NA General Partnership v. Commissioner,
118
 the Tax 
Court held that petitioner’s $932 million of interest payments made on 
intercompany loans were properly deductible because the cash advance 
should be characterized as debt.
119
  In this case, ScottishPower plc 
(ScottishPower) advanced almost $5 billion to NA General Partnership 
(NAGP).
120
  The cash advanced was recorded with loan notes, which had 
specified maturity dates and allowed ScottishPower the right to enforce 
payment.
121
  The Tax Court analyzed eleven factors, many of which 
coincided with the factors in Hewlett-Packard.
122
 
In analyzing the factor of thin capitalization, the Tax Court 
emphasized the importance of analyzing the debt-to-equity ratio in the 
context of the corporation’s industry.
123
  “For example, companies with 
high levels of business risk, such as those in highly uncertain 
environments (e.g., high-tech) or in cyclical or volatile industries 
generally cannot bear the risk of significant leverage.  The opposite is 
true generally for companies with low business risk (e.g., utilities).”
124
  
In this case, NAGP’s expert witness compared the debt-to-equity ratio of 
NAGP to the ratios of similarly situated utilities, which the court used to 
arrive at its holding.
125
  The expert witness also utilized the fair market 
value of NAGP’s equity value to determine that NAGP had an adequate 
                                                          
 116.   Id. at 1752–53 (citation omitted).  
 117.   Id.  
 118.   NA Gen. P’ship v. Comm’r, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1916, No. 525-10, 2012 WL 2344719, at 
*1 (June 19, 2012).  
 119.   Id.   
 120.   Id. at *3.   
 121.   Id. at *6–8.  
 122.   See id. at *6.  Specifically, the factors are:  
(1) the name given to the documents evidencing the indebtedness; (2) the presence of a 
fixed maturity date; (3) the source of the payments; (4) the right to enforce payments of 
principal and interest; (5) participation in management; (6) a status equal to or inferior to 
that of regular corporate creditors; (7) the intent of the parties; (8) “thin” or adequate 
capitalization; (9) identity of interest between creditor and stockholder; (10) payment of 
interest only out of “dividend” money and (11) the corporation’s ability to obtain loans 
from outside lending institutions. 
Id. 
 123.   Id. at *12 (“The debt to equity ratio that is adequate in one industry may be inadequate in 
another.”).   
 124.   Id.  
 125.   Id. at *12–13. 
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capital structure to support debt characterization.
126
 
Third, in PepsiCo Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Commissioner,
127
 the Tax 
Court held that advance agreements issued by foreign subsidiaries to 
domestic subsidiaries should be characterized as equity.
128
  The Tax 
Court analyzed thirteen factors to arrive at its holding.
129
  In determining 
the “thinness” of capital structure factor supported equity 
characterization, the court relied on the entity’s debt-to-equity ratio 
according to industry standards.
130
  In addition, the court noted: 
“[P]erhaps most convincingly, . . . a commercial bank or third party 
lender would not have engaged in transactions of comparable risk.”
131
  
Similar to its analysis in NA General Partnership, the Tax Court 
emphasized the importance of industry standards in analyzing the debt-
to-equity ratio, as well as the importance of third party lenders.
132
 
The common themes of these three cases show the types of cases on 
which the IRS, as well as the Tax Court, currently focus.
133
  First, these 
cases portray the large dollars at stake for corporations regarding the debt 
versus equity characterization of a cash advance.
134
  Second, these cases 
support the importance of analyzing the debt-to-equity ratio in the 
context of the subsidiary’s industry.
135
  Finally, these cases exhibit that 




                                                          
 126.   Id.  
 127.   PepsiCo P.R., Inc. v. Comm’r, 104 T.C.M. (CCH) 322 (2012).  
 128.   Id. at 322, 345. 
 129.   Id. at 335.  Specifically, the factors are:  
(1) names or labels given to the instruments; (2) presence or absence of a fixed maturity 
date; (3) source of payments; (4) right to enforce payments; (5) participation in 
management as a result of the advances; (6) status of the advances in relation to regular 
corporate creditors; (7) intent of the parties; (8) identity of interest between creditor and 
stockholder; (9) “thinness” of capital structure in relation to debt; (10) ability of the 
corporation to obtain credit from outside sources; (11) use to which advances were put; 
(12) failure of debtor to repay; and (13) risk involved in making advances. 
Id. (citing Dixie Dairies Corp. v. Comm’r, 74 T.C. 476, 493 (1980)).  
 130.   Id. at 343–44.   
 131.   Id. at 345. 
 132.   See id. at 343–44.  
 133.   See Reynolds, supra note 9 (noting that, following the release of these three opinions, an 
IRS Special Counsel stated that “when the primary purpose of a transaction is to get to a tax 
answer . . . that does affect the analysis”).  These three cases may indicate an overall trend of the 
IRS’s success against taxpayers that entered into transactions lacking a valid business purpose. 
 134.   See supra note 110 and accompanying text.  
 135.   See supra notes 123 and 132 and accompanying text.  
 136.   Philip Antoon, Intercompany Debt—How Much is Reasonable?, ALVAREZ & MARSAL 
(Aug. 6, 2013), http://www.alvarezandmarsal.com/intercompany-debt-%E2%80%94-how-much-
reasonable-0.   
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3. Case Law Supporting Thin Capitalization as a Principal Factor 
Although this field of law may defy symmetry, the ultimate issue in 
the debt versus equity distinction lies in objective tests of economic 
reality.
137
  The touchstone of economic reality is “whether the transaction 
would have taken the same form had it been between the corporation and 
an outside lender.”
138
  In the context of debt versus equity classification, 
an economic reality test asks whether the “funds were advanced with the 




Here, the debt-to-equity ratio is the most commonly used criterion to 
analyze economic reality.
140
  For instance, an outside creditor is more 
willing to extend funds if a corporation has a low debt-to-equity ratio, 
which is associated with more assets available to support loans.
141
  In 
other words, a creditor is likely more secure if there is a “cushion” in 
shareholders’ equity.
142
  In addition to analyzing economic reality, the 
ratio is also the most objective way to determine if a corporation is thinly 
capitalized.
143
  Therefore, thin capitalization has remained a principal 
factor in judicial analysis over the past several decades.
144
 
Courts have not determined a safe harbor that automatically would 
classify debt as a “sham merely because of a high debt-to-equity 
ratio.”
145
  Rather, courts look to the industry of the corporation to 
                                                          
 137.   See Scriptomatic, Inc. v. United States, 555 F.2d 364, 367 (3d Cir. 1977), aff’g 397 F. 
Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (asserting that in debt versus equity cases “the ultimate issue is 
measurement of the transaction by objective tests of economic reality”).  See also Litton Bus. Sys., 
Inc. v. Comm’r, 61 T.C. 367, 377 (1973) (stating that in debt versus equity cases the ultimate 
question is: “Was there a genuine intention to create a debt, with a reasonable expectation of 
repayment, and did that intention comport with the economic reality of creating a debtor-creditor 
relationship?”).   
 138.   See Scriptomatic, 555 F.2d at 367. 
 139.   Becker, supra note 28, at 221. 
 140.   See Scriptomatic, Inc. v. United States, 397 F. Supp. 753, 762 (E.D. Pa. 1975).   
 141.   See Gibson, supra note 7, at 480 (“The creditor’s position is more secure if there exists a 
cushion at the shareholder equity level.  Presumably, an outside creditor is more willing to extend 
credit if a corporation has a low debt-to-equity ratio, as there are more assets available to support 
additional loans.”). 
 142.   Id. 
 143.   See Becker, supra note 28, at 228 (asserting that a debt-to-equity ratio test is based upon 
“more objective and verifiable criteria”).   
 144.   See id. at 221 (stating that the adequacy of capitalization of the corporation is a 
“significant, but not conclusive, factor in distinguishing stock from debt”).  See also Gibson, supra 
note 7, at 480 (“[T]hin capitalization remains an important element in the judicial analysis of the 
debt/equity distinction.”). 
 145.   Leach Corp. v. Comm’r, 30 T.C. 563, 578 (1958).  See also Jim McEvoy, Canada: U.S. 
Federal Rules Applicable to Loans from a Canadian Parent to a U.S. Subsidiary, COLLINS BARROW 
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determine the reasonableness of the debt-to-equity ratio.
146
  Expert 
testimony is considered to determine whether a corporation is adequately 
capitalized according to the standards of the corporation’s industry.
147
  
As a result, the amount of equity capital that would be inadequate in one 
industry may be sufficient by standards of another industry.
148
 
Courts have also considered the prospect of future earnings, which 
may justify a high debt-to-equity ratio and result in debt 
characterization.
149
  While the Treasury proposed regulations in 1980 for 
both the outside and inside debt-to-equity ratios,
150
 the Tenth Circuit held 
that the relevant ratio is the outside ratio, which compares the 
corporation’s total liabilities to shareholders’ equity.
151
  The Tenth 
Circuit’s rationale was that the outside ratio “is the ratio a prospective 




Several cases have noted the importance of the debt-to-equity ratio to 
the analysis.
153
  In Laidlaw Transportation, Inc. v. Commissioner,
154
 the 
Tax Court defined a cash advance as equity if “(a) the debt to equity ratio 
was initially high, (b) the parties realized that [the ratio] would likely go 
                                                          
2 (May 2014), http://www.collinsbarrow.com/uploads/docs/newsletter/national/taxation/2014/us-tax-
alert-may-2014.pdf (asserting that the IRS will respect debt characterization if the corporation’s 
debt-to-equity ratio does not exceed 3 to 1); HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF 
CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 416 n.15 (West Publ’g Co., 3d ed. 1983) 
(asserting that a debt-to-equity ratio of 4 to 1 should be a rule of thumb to guarantee debt treatment). 
 146.   See Scotland Mills, Inc. v. Comm’r, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 265, 273 (1965) (“What amounts to 
adequate capitalization varies according to the industry and within the industry according to the type 
of operation planned.”).  See also Sigmon v. Comm’r, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 1567, 1584–85 (1988) 
(analyzing thin capitalization in light of the economic realities of petitioner’s integrated coal 
business).  
 147.   See Scotland Mills, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) at 273 (stating that courts “must give consideration 
to expert testimony as to whether a given company is adequately capitalized by the standards of the 
industry”). 
 148.   See Steven Kaplan & Guillaume Lefebvre, CAT Bonds: Tax Treatment of an Innovative 
Financial Product, 16 J. TAX’N F. INSTITUTIONS 5, 11 (2003) (“Courts have recognized that industry 
practices may justify any ratio, even though an amount of equity capital that would be inadequate to 
launch a corporation in one industry may be quite sufficient by the standards of another . . . .”).  
 149.   See Baker Commodities, Inc. v. Comm’r, 48 T.C. 374, 396–98 (1967), aff’d, 415 F.2d 519 
(9th Cir. 1969) (holding that a debt-to-equity ratio of almost 700 to 1 was not unrealistic, resulting in 
bona fide indebtedness, given the corporation’s financial success in the four years subsequent to the 
note’s issuance). 
 150.   See supra note 61 and accompanying text.   
 151.   Jensen v. Comm’r, No. 98-9021, 2000 WL 300208, at *4 (10th Cir. Mar. 23, 2000).   
 152.   Id.  
 153.   See, e.g., Kraft Foods Co. v. Comm’r, 232 F.2d 118, 127 (2d Cir. 1956) (“[T]he debt-
equity ratio resulting from a transaction is of great importance in determining whether an ambiguous 
instrument is a debt or an equity interest . . . .”).   
 154.   Laidlaw Transp., Inc. v. Comm’r, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 2598 (1998).   
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higher, and (c) the recipient of the funds used a substantial part of the 
funds to buy capital assets and to meet expenses needed to begin 
operations.”
155
  Additionally, in Bauer v. Commissioner,
156
 the Ninth 
Circuit examined the debt-to-equity ratio “to determine whether a 
corporation is so thinly capitalized that a business loss would result in an 
inability to repay the advance; such an advance would be indicative of 
venture capital rather than a loan.”
157
  The court was “concerned with the 
degree of risk the loan presents to the lender and whether an independent 
lender, such as a bank, would be willing to make the loan.”
158
  Therefore, 
one of the common factors among the circuits’ lists of factors, as well as 
the factors listed in section 385 and Notice 94-47, is the “thinness” of the 





The courts’ application of the debt versus equity factors as a whole 
makes clear that thin capitalization is a principal factor.  Therefore, the 
Treasury should propose regulations under section 385 to establish thin 
capitalization as a principal factor in the analysis.  The regulations should 
also define the inputs—namely, total indebtedness and total assets minus 
total indebtedness—into the calculation of the debt-to-equity ratio.  Such 
regulations would have the beneficial effects of decreasing litigation, 
fulfilling congressional intent, increasing predictability and consistency, 
and incentivizing corporations to decrease debt. 
A. Other Debt Versus Equity Factors 
Before turning to a specific discussion of thin capitalization, 
however, a brief critique of several other factors listed in case law, 
section 385, and Notice 94-47 is necessary.  Several of the factors have 
been discounted or considered irrelevant in particular cases, showing that 
the factors—derived from case law from the mid-1900s—are no longer 
relevant in the current financial market.  These factors include 
participation in management, subordination, intent of the parties, sinking 
fund or source of payments, and use of cash advance to purchase capital 
                                                          
 155.   Id. at 2620.  
 156.   Bauer v. Comm’r, 748 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 157.   Id. at 1369 (citing Gilbert v. Comm’r, 248 F.2d 399, 407 (2d Cir. 1957)). 
 158.   Id.  
 159.   See supra notes 59, 75, 82–85 and accompanying text.  
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assets. 
1. Participation in Management 
One of the factors listed in Notice 94-47 and analyzed in several 
cases is “whether the instruments give the holders the right to participate 
in the management of the issuer.”
160
  If a purported creditor has an 
increased right to participate in management of the issuer because of the 
cash advance, then the purported creditor participates as a shareholder 
rather than as a bona fide creditor.
161
  Thus, the IRS would likely argue 
that the purported debt should be characterized as equity.
162
 
As the Third Circuit noted, however, it may be common for creditors 
to sit on a corporation’s board of directors, particularly when the 
corporation has financial problems.
163
  Similarly, the Tax Court noted 
that creditors’ participation in management may be “necessary for 
compliance with State law on securities registration.”
164
  Because a 
lender’s participation in management may be required in some 
jurisdictions, this factor should not hold much weight in the debt versus 
equity analysis.  The Tax Court recognizes this observation and has 
conceded that this factor is neutral in cases in which a parent advances 
cash to a subsidiary.
165
  Therefore, participation in management is of 
little value in the debt versus equity analysis. 
2. Subordination 
Case law, section 385, and Notice 94-47 also refer to subordination, 
which considers “whether the rights of the holders of the instruments are 
subordinate to rights of general creditors.”
166
  Accordingly, if the holders 
of the instruments have rights subordinate to the rights of general 
creditors, then this suggests the cash advance should be characterized as 
equity.
167
  The Tax Court has observed, however, that subordination has 
                                                          
 160.   I.R.S. Notice 94-47, 1994-1 C.B. 357.  
 161.   See Estate of Mixon v. United States, 464 F.2d 394, 406 (5th Cir. 1972).  
 162.   See id.   
 163.   Cohen v. KB Mezzanine Fund II, LP (In re SubMicron Sys. Corp.), 432 F.3d 448, 457–58 
(3d Cir. 2006) (“[I]t is ‘not unusual for lenders to have designees on a company’s board, particularly 
when the company [is] a distressed one.’”) (quoting In re SubMicron Sys. Corp., 291 B.R. 314, 325–
26 (D. Del. 2003)).   
 164.   Green Bay Structural Steel, Inc. v. Comm’r, 53 T.C. 451, 456 (1969). 
 165.   See Am. Offshore, Inc. v. Comm’r, 97 T.C. 579, 603 (1991).  
 166.   I.R.S. Notice 94-47, 1994-1 C.B. 357.  
 167.   See Estate of Mixon v. United States, 464 F.2d 394, 406 (5th Cir. 1972). 
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become “increasingly common in the business world” and should not 
preclude the cash advances from constituting bona fide indebtedness.
168
  
In Green Bay Structural Steel, Inc. v. Commissioner,
169
 the Tax Court 
took a step further by treating subordination as an “approved business 
practice,” rather than treating the note holders as preferred 
shareholders.
170
  Thus, subordination holds little weight in the debt 
versus equity analysis. 
3.  Intent of the Parties 
The intent of the parties is also a factor considered when determining 
debt versus equity characterization.
171
  In other words, did the parties 
intend for the financial instrument to be treated as debt or equity?  
However, as the Fifth Circuit observed, the problem here is that “courts 
look to intent only when other relevant, objective factors regarding the 
transaction fail to clearly indicate either debt or equity.”
172
  As discussed 
above,
173
 in Laidlaw Transportation, Inc. v. Commissioner,
174
 the Tax 
Court noted that if the parties indicate their intent by labeling a document 
as debt when in substance it is equity, the intent of the parties holds little, 
if any, weight.
175
  Accordingly, the intent of the parties holds minimal 
weight in the debt versus equity analysis. 
4. Sinking Fund or Source of Payments 
Not mentioned in section 385 or Notice 94-47,
176
 the two factors of 
sinking fund and source of payments are duplicative because a sinking 
fund is an account reserved specifically for repayment of debt.
177
  Courts 
have held that if a sinking fund is a source of interest and principal 
payments, courts are more likely to assign debt characterization to the 
                                                          
 168.   Estate of Hosmer v. Comm’r, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 77, 82 (1973).  
 169.   Green Bay, 53 T.C. at 451. 
 170.   Id. at 457 (quoting United States v. Snyder Bros. Co., 367 F.2d 980, 989 (5th Cir. 1966) 
(Gewin, J., dissenting)).  See also Greenaway & Marion, supra note 24, at 87 (“Subordination is an 
accepted business practice.”).   
 171.   See I.R.S. Notice 94-47, 1994-1 C.B. 357 (listing a factor of “whether the instruments are 
intended to be treated as debt or equity for non-tax purposes”). 
 172.   Tex. Farm Bureau v. United States, 732 F.2d 437, 438 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing Estate of 
Mixon, 464 F.2d at 407–08; Tyler v. Tomlinson, 414 F.2d 844 (5th Cir. 1969)).  
 173.   See supra text accompanying notes 101–03.  
 174.   Laidlaw Transp., Inc. v. Comm’r, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 2598 (1998).  
 175.   See id. at 2617, 2624.   
 176.   See supra notes 59 and 73–75 and accompanying text.  
 177.   See Green Bay Structural Steel, Inc. v. Comm’r, 53 T.C. 451, 455 (1969).   
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cash advance from the parent to the subsidiary corporation.
178
  
Alternatively, if there is not a sinking fund and the source of interest 
payments is earnings of the borrowing corporation, courts are more 
likely to characterize the cash advance as equity because repayment of 
the cash advance looks like a dividend.
179
 
The Tax Court has supported debt characterization and found 
nothing objectionable about payment of interest through earnings when 
projected earnings are substantial and adequate assets act as a reserve.
180
  
Similarly, the Tax Court has discounted this factor by holding debt 
characterization where financial projections provided reasonable 
justification to expect repayment of both accrued interest and the 
principal amount of advances.
181
  As a result, debt characterization may 
result notwithstanding the source of repayments of interest or 
principal.
182
  Therefore, these factors are of little value in the debt versus 
equity analysis. 
5. Use of Cash Advance to Purchase Capital Assets 
Some courts, in determining whether a cash advance is debt or 
equity, have considered whether the borrowing corporation used cash 
advances to purchase capital assets.
183
  Similar to the sinking fund and 
source of payments factors, this factor is not listed in either section 385 
or Notice 94-47.
184
  Yet, several court opinions have looked to this factor 
to characterize a cash advance as equity.  In Scriptomatic, Inc. v. United 
States,
185
 the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
disregarded this factor, asserting: 
First, to require, as a rule of law, that to avoid certain tax consequences 
a company must acquire its core assets solely with capital funds is 
unrealistic and unfair.  It is not necessary that essential properties be 
acquired by paid in equity for a company to have a sound financial 
structure.  In fact, it may be detrimental to tie up its total capital in that 
                                                          
 178.   See id. at 458.   
 179.   See id.  
 180.   Id.  
 181.   Racal Elecs., Inc. v. Comm’r, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 756, 767–68 (1990).  
 182.   Greenaway & Marion, supra note 24, at 85.   
 183.   See, e.g., Roth Steel Tube Co. v. Comm’r, 800 F.2d 625, 630 (6th Cir. 1986) (including 
within an eleven-factor test a factor for “the extent to which the advances were used to acquire 
capital assets”) (citing Raymond v. United States, 511 F.2d 185, 190–91 (6th Cir. 1975))).  
 184.   See supra notes 59 and 73–75 and accompanying text.  
 185.   Scriptomatic, Inc. v. United States, 397 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff’d, 555 F.2d 364 
(3d Cir. 1977).  
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way.  It is common business practice to obtain financing to buy core 
assets from many different sources.
186
 
The district court pointed out that businesses often use third party 
debt, rather than shareholders’ equity, to purchase capital assets.
187
  
Other courts have concurred because some courts simply ignore this 
factor.
188
  Consequently, this factor holds little weight in the debt versus 
equity analysis. 
B. Thin Capitalization as a Principal Debt Versus Equity Factor 
The numerous factors used by the courts to analyze the debt versus 
equity issue can “easily [be] manipulated and no one factor alone is 
determinative.”
189
  As such, “reliance on more objective types of 
evidence is generally desirable” to resolve debt versus equity 
controversies.
190
  The debt-to-equity ratio offers an objective evaluation 
of whether a cash advance is debt or equity for tax purposes, and the 
ratio serves as a strong indication of whether the corporation is thinly 
capitalized. 
While several other factors in the debt versus equity analysis have 
proved of little value, thin capitalization remains a principal factor.  In 
John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner,
191
 the Supreme Court of the United 
States established the importance of thin capitalization as the test for 
economic reality in passing dictum: “As material amounts of capital were 
invested in stock, we need not consider the effect of extreme situations 
such as nominal stock investments and an obviously excessive debt 
structure.”
192
  Thin capitalization, determined from the debt-to-equity 




An empirical analysis of 126 debt versus equity cases decided 
between 1954 and 1987 revealed that the debt-to-equity ratio is a 
                                                          
 186.   Id. at 763.  
 187.   See id.   
 188.   See Delta Plastics, Inc. v. Comm’r, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 940, 943 (2003) (characterizing a 
cash advance as debt when a substantial portion was used to acquire capital assets).  
 189.   Conway, supra note 21, at 290.   
 190.   Tex. Farm Bureau v. United States, 732 F.2d 437, 439 (5th Cir. 1984). 
 191.   John Kelley Co. v. Comm’r, 326 U.S. 521 (1946).  
 192.   Id. at 526.   
 193.   See, e.g., Post Corp. v. United States, 640 F.2d 1296, 1307–08 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (determining 
that the subsidiary had very little cash and no income, and thus characterizing the cash advance as 
equity).   
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principal factor.
194
  Performed by three experts in tax law, the study 
found the seven “most discriminative” factors: (1) enforcement of 
creditor’s rights; (2) debt-to-equity ratio; (3) creditworthiness of 
borrower; (4) formal documentation; (5) use of corporate profits as the 
source of repayment; (6) subordination; and (7) sinking fund.
195
  While 
the debt-to-equity ratio is not at the top of the list, it is noteworthy that 
the creditworthiness of the borrower—often determined by use of the 
debt-to-equity ratio—is among these factors.  Because these factors 
appear duplicative, this observation indicates their combined importance 
to the debt versus equity analysis. 
Analysis by other commentators supports the assertion that thin 
capitalization is a principal factor of the debt versus equity analysis.  
Two commentators of KPMG LLP classified the debt versus equity 
factors into four categories: useful, malleable, neutral, and deadwood.
196
  
The useful category included: (1) “Intent of the parties”; (2) “Thinness of 
capital structure”; (3) “Credit risk”; and (4) “Source of ‘interest’ 
payments.”
197
  Similar to the empirical analysis published in 1990, 
Greenaway and Marion rank thin capitalization and credit risk, or 




In a similar way, another commentator proposed a direct approach to 
the debt versus equity classification by using the “availability of third-
party loans” as the principal test to apply to shareholder loans in closely 
held corporations.
199
  Focusing primarily on this factor supports the 
assertion that the “thinness” of capital structure is a major factor because 
in order to obtain a third-party loan, an entity must not be “thinly” 
capitalized and must have a comparatively advantageous debt-to-equity 
ratio. 
In contrast, other commentators assert that the factor of the issuer’s 
capitalization should be disregarded altogether from the analysis in 
                                                          
 194.   See Paul J. Robertson, Zoel Daughtrey, & Daryl V. Burckel, Debt or Equity? An Empirical 
Analysis of Tax Court Classification During the Period 1955-1987, 47 TAX NOTES 707 (1990).  
 195.   Id. at 711–17. 
 196.   Greenaway & Marion, supra note 24, at 81, 92.  
 197.   Id. at 92.  Unhelpful because they are within a taxpayer’s control, malleable factors 
included: (1) “Name of instrument”; (2) “Right to enforce payments”; (3) “Presence of maturity 
date”; and (4) “Repayment history.”  Id.  Adding little to the analysis when viewed in isolation, 
neutral factors included: (1) “Identity of interest”; (2) “Subordination”; and (3) “Participation in 
management.”  Id.  Considered archaic, deadwood factors included: (1) “Source of repayment” and 
(2) “Use of advances.”  Id.   
 198.   See id. at 88, 90–91. 
 199.   Wayne M. Gazur, An Arm’s Length Solution to the Shareholder Loan Tax Puzzle, 40 
SETON HALL L. REV. 407, 418 (2010).   
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nearly all circumstances because “[a] corporation should be free to 
choose its own best mix of debt and equity without concern that the 
Service or courts will subsequently reclassify some of its debt as equity 
for tax purposes.”
200
  Furthermore, “[t]he average debt ratio of some very 
successful corporations in Japan would fail almost all of the tests 
advanced in the past by courts and the Treasury.”
201
  Although these 
observations may be true, the issuer’s capital structure is a main factor 
that a lending institution, such as a bank or credit union, would consider 
when deciding whether to extend credit to a debtor.
202
  The debt-to-
equity ratio is “often used by lenders to determine whether an enterprise 
can obtain additional future financing . . . [and] whether that enterprise is 
in compliance with debt covenants under existing obligations.”
203
  While 
a corporation should be free to choose its own debt-equity mix, if the 
corporation has a very high debt-to-equity ratio that would cause a third-
party creditor to not lend funds, the corporation should not be entitled to 
debt characterization—and associated interest deductions—for U.S. 
federal income tax purposes.  Therefore, thin capitalization proves a 
principal factor in the debt versus equity analysis. 
C. Proposal to Solve the Debacle 
Case law has demonstrated that thin capitalization is a principal 
factor in the debt versus equity analysis.
204
  Yet, there is a general lack of 
guidance for the corporate taxpayer regarding thin capitalization.
205
  
Therefore, the Treasury should provide guidance to improve the tax 
system,
206
 increase predictability for taxpayers and consistency across the 
courts, and decrease litigation.
207
  Although some commentators believe 
                                                          
 200.   Eicher & Hitt, supra note 8.   
 201.   Id.   
 202.   See JCT, supra note 29, at 91.  The Joint Committee on Taxation explained: 
[The entity’s leverage] ratio is an important metric often used by lenders to determine 
whether an enterprise can obtain additional future financing, how expensive that 
financing will be (for example, incremental debt can reduce the issuer’s credit rating), as 
well as whether that enterprise is in compliance with debt covenants under existing 
obligations.  
  Id. 
 203.   Id.  
 204.   See supra Part III.B.  
 205.   See supra Part II.A.3., II.B.1.  
 206.   Taylor et al., supra note 6 (asserting that section 385 regulations would “substantially 
improve the tax system”).  
 207.   See Becker, supra note 28, at 234 (asserting that section 385 regulations would “add 
considerable certainty to the planning of capital structures of corporations” and “should significantly 
reduce the litigation in this area”). 
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that debt versus equity issues should be determined solely under case 
law,
208
 Congress intended the Treasury to provide guidance through 
section 385 regulations for corporate taxpayers.
209
 
Specifically, under section 385(a), the Secretary of the Treasury 
should prescribe the “necessary or appropriate”
210
 regulations to provide 
more guidance on thin capitalization.  As discussed above,
211
 the 
proposed regulations should establish the “thinness” of capital structure, 
and associated debt-to-equity ratio calculation,
212
 as a principal factor for 
debt versus equity characterization.  The term principal factor means that 
the proposed regulations should specify that thin capitalization is not a 
dispositive factor in the analysis (i.e. as a single factor in the analysis, it 
is not determinative of debt or equity characterization); however, the 
factor of thin capitalization must be considered in determining whether a 
cash advance is debt or equity.
213
  The proposed regulations should not 
dictate an objective safe harbor debt-to-equity ratio because of differing 
business models across industries.
214
  Furthermore, the proposed 
regulations should specify that the fair market values of debt and 
equity—rather than adjusted tax basis or book value—must be used for 
inputs of the ratio.
215
 
                                                          
 208.   Taylor et al., supra note 6 (including commentary from Sol Coffino, President of Tax 
Executives Institute, Inc., who felt that debt-equity issues should be resolved under case law, at the 
time of the withdrawal of the proposed regulations in 1983). 
 209.   Id.  In 1983, Robert H. Aland of the Chicago office of Baker & McKenzie stated: 
[T]he withdrawal of the final and proposed regulations under section 385, including the 
hybrid instrument provisions, constitutes a serious error on the part of the Service, since it 
frustrates the congressional purpose in 1969 for enacting section 385, which was to 
provide (primarily through regulations) guidance for taxpayers in distinguishing debt 
from equity for federal income tax purposes.   
Id. 
 210.   I.R.C. § 385(a) (2012).  
 211.   See supra Part III.B.  
 212.   The proposed regulations should also establish the debt-to-equity ratio calculation to take 
place at the end of the taxable year, consistent with section 163(j).  See I.R.C. § 163(j)(2)(A)(ii) 
(asserting the applicable ratio of debt to equity is “as of the close of such taxable year”).  
 213.   Treasury regulations use the term principal factor in other contexts.  For example, a 
Treasury regulation under § 2032A regarding material participation in farm or other business 
operations states: “No single factor is determinative of the presence of material participation, but 
physical work and participation in management decisions are the principal factors to be considered.”  
Treas. Reg. § 20.2032A-3(e)(2) (as amended in 1981).  Additionally, in determining whether income 
or capital gain is “effectively connected for the taxable year with the conduct of a trade or business 
in the United States,” the principal factors to be applied are the asset-use test and the business-
activities test.  Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4 (as amended in 2005).   
 214.   See infra Part III.C.1.  
 215.   See infra Part III.C.2.  The proposed regulations should contain the following crucial 
language regarding fair market value: 
The debt-to-equity ratio of a corporation is the ratio that (i) the fair market value of the 
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1. No Objective Safe Harbor Debt-to-Equity Ratio 
Regarding a safe harbor debt-to-equity ratio, in Post Corp. v. United 
States,
216
 the Court of Claims observed: “[C]ourts have uniformly 
rejected any fixed ratio of debt to equity as a per se test of tax avoidance, 
recognizing instead that corporations in various industries and in 
different stages of development have legitimate needs for varying debt 
structures . . . .”
217
  The Court of Claims’ observation is unequivocally 
true because courts have ruled across the entire spectrum in regards to 
debt-to-equity ratios.
218
  Courts have found debt characterization where 
the corporation’s debt-to-equity ratios were 17 to 1,
219





  In addition, the Tax Court found equity characterization 
where the corporation’s debt-to-equity ratio was 166 to 1
222
 and 9.5 to 
1.
223
  These irreconcilable figures provide further support that the 
regulations should not provide for a safe harbor debt-to-equity ratio.  
Rather, the focus should be on the economic reality and industry of the 
corporation. 
The Tax Court exemplified this approach in Delta Plastics, Inc. v. 
Commissioner.
224
  Holding that the cash advance was debt,
225
 the court 
stated: 
                                                          
corporation’s liabilities, bears to (ii) the corporation’s stockholders’ equity.  The 
stockholders’ equity in a corporation is the excess of (i) the fair market value of its assets, 
over (ii) the fair market value of its liabilities.  Fair market value is the price at which an 
asset or liability would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither 
being under any compulsion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable knowledge of 
all relevant facts. 
The language in these definitions is modeled off of Proposed Regulation § 1.385-3(b)–(c).  See Prop. 
Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(b)–(c), 45 Fed. Reg. 18,957, 18,964 (Mar. 24, 1980). 
 216.   Post Corp. v. United States, 640 F.2d 1296 (Ct. Cl. 1981).   
 217.   Id. at 1307.  
 218.   See infra notes 219–23 and accompanying text. 
 219.   Adams v. Comm’r, 58 T.C. 41, 53–54, 57 (1972). 
 220.   Sun Props., Inc. v. United States, 220 F.2d 171, 175 (5th Cir. 1955).  
 221.   Baker Commodities, Inc. v. Comm’r, 48 T.C. 374, 396 n.20, 401 (1967), aff’d, 415 F.2d 
519 (9th Cir. 1969).  
 222.   Fries v. Comm’r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2085, 2086, 2089–90 (1997).  
 223.   Sigmon v. Comm’r, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 1567, 1584, 1586 (1988).  Here, the court stated: 
[The debt-to-equity ratio of 9.5 to 1] indicates that the companies as a group were thinly 
capitalized.  The large deficits in retained earnings and negative owners’ equity for most 
of these companies also supports our finding that the integrated coal business operated by 
Sigmon was thinly capitalized.  This factor further supports our conclusion that this 
advance represented a contribution to capital. 
Id. at 1584.   
 224.   Delta Plastics, Inc. v. Comm’r, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 940 (2003).   
 225.   Id. at 944. 
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In spite of petitioner’s initial debt-to-equity ratio of 26:1, prior to 
startup of petitioner, petitioner’s officers and directors understood 
petitioner’s business and the plastics manufacturing industry and 
reasonably projected that petitioner would be successful.  As a result of 
revenues quickly generated by its operations, petitioner’s debt-to-equity 
ratio was reduced in just over 3 years to 4:1.  This reduction indicates 




In this case, if the Tax Court had applied a safe harbor debt-to-equity 
ratio of 10 to 1,
227
 then the 26 to 1 ratio would have failed the safe harbor 
test from the outset.  Thus, the result would have been that the cash 
advance was equity, not debt.  However, the Tax Court looked to the 
economic reality of the capital structure and to the financial situation of 
the corporation to arrive at its holding.
228
 
While lack of an objective safe harbor may provide no definite 
criteria for corporations to judge whether a court will consider its capital 
structure inadequate,
229
 the flexibility of debt-to-equity ratios across 
industries trumps the safe harbor approach.
230
  While companies may 
typically issue debt with a debt-to-equity ratio of approximately 3 to 1, 
there may be industries in which a supportable debt-to-equity ratio is 
above or below this level.
231
  For example, a reasonable debt-to-equity in 
the insurance industry may be unreasonable in other industries.  
Therefore, the proposed regulations should not dictate a safe harbor debt-
to-equity ratio. 
2. Fair Market Values for the Debt-to-Equity Ratio 
Because the debt-to-equity ratio is critical to the debt versus equity 
                                                          
 226.   Id. at 943.  
 227.   The proposed regulations from 1982 provided a safe harbor ratio of 10 to 1.  See Prop. 
Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(g)(3)(i), 47 Fed. Reg. 164, 182 (Jan. 5, 1982). 
 228.   See Delta Plastics, Inc., 85 T.C.M. (CCH) at 943–44. 
 229.   See Gibson, supra note 7, at 482 (“[D]espite the potential benefits of flexibility, the 
amalgamation of ratios deemed acceptable and unacceptable by various courts provides no definite 
criteria for corporations to judge whether a court will consider its capital structure inadequate.”); 
Eicher & Hitt, supra note 8 (“[A] safe harbor is still necessary so that taxpayers can structure 
financing transactions without fear of subjective interpretation of the rules by courts and the 
Service.”).  See also Gibson, supra note 7, at 482 (“In order to provide more certainty to the 
corporate community, the Congress, Treasury Department, or the courts should develop safe harbor 
rules, expressly indicating what ratios presumptively will be considered adequate.”). 
 230.   For instance, the IRS considers the importance of industry norms by referring to them in 
the fact pattern of Revenue Ruling 85-119: “HC is not thinly capitalized.  Whether the Notes 
constitute debt or equity, after their issuance HC will have a debt-equity ratio that is within the 
industry norm.”  Rev. Rul. 85-119, 1985-2 C.B. 60.  
 231.  Antoon, supra note 136.  
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analysis, the proposed regulations should address the calculation of the 
debt-to-equity ratio.  Over the decades of litigation in this area, courts 
have not agreed upon standards or a mathematical formula for the debt-
to-equity ratio.
232
  Some commentators posit that this lack of agreement 
suggests that the ratio is “rarely decisive despite the effort practitioners 
and the Service tend to put into the calculations.”
233
  However, this 
argument loses sight of the main purpose of looking to the debt-to-equity 
ratio, which is to evaluate the economic reality of the corporation’s 
capitalization structure.  If a prospective borrower is thinly capitalized, a 
lender will not expect to be repaid, and thus will likely not advance funds 
to the prospective borrower.
234
 
While case law proves ambiguous regarding the calculation of the 
debt-to-equity ratio, legislative history for section 385 indicates that 
Congress intended that “[t]he debt-equity ratio of the issuing corporation 
for purposes of this test generally is determined by comparing the 
corporation’s total indebtedness with the excess of its money and other 
assets over that indebtedness.”
235
  These inputs—total indebtedness and 
total equity (total assets minus total indebtedness)—can be valued at (1) 
adjusted tax basis, (2) book value, or (3) fair market value.
236
  Among 
these alternatives, use of fair market value inputs would best present the 
economic reality of the corporation’s capitalization structure. 
a. Adjusted Tax Basis 
Adjusted tax basis offers one option to value the inputs in the debt-
to-equity ratio.  Adjusted tax basis reflects “past tax treatment” of a 
corporation’s assets and liabilities.
237
  The Treasury’s proposed section 
385 regulations from the early 1980s calculated the ratio by using the 
adjusted tax basis of a corporation’s liabilities, excluding trade payables, 
over the adjusted tax basis of stockholders’ equity.
238
  Similarly, section 
                                                          
 232.   See Universal Racquetball Rockville Ctr. Corp. v. Comm’r, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 143, 148 
(1986).  See also Gibson, supra note 7, at 482 (noting the great ambiguity in determining the inputs 
into the debt-to-equity ratio because “different courts include different items in both the numerator 
and denominator of the ratio”).   
 233.   Greenaway & Marion, supra note 24, at 88.  
 234.   See id. at 110 (“Lenders do not reasonably expect to be repaid from undercapitalized 
borrowers with no cash flow and poor credit.”).  
 235.   S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 140 (1969), as reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, 2172.  
 236.   See discussion infra Parts III.C.2.a–c. 
 237.   See Jesse V. Boyles & Randolph J. Rush, The Regulations Under Section 385: A Review, 
Evaluation, and Suggested Approach, 27 VILL. L. REV. 52, 69 (1981–82) (“[A]djusted [tax] basis is 
primarily a reflection of the past tax treatment of assets.”).  
 238.   Supplementary Information to Proposed Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg. 18,957, 18,959 (Mar. 
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163(j) utilizes adjusted tax basis to calculate the debt-to-equity ratio to 
prevent deductibility of interest paid to a related tax exempt or foreign 
entity.
239
  Thus, use of the adjusted tax basis of a corporation’s debt and 
equity for proposed regulations under section 385 would be consistent 
with section 163(j).
240
  In addition, adjusted tax basis values could be 
more easily accessible than fair market value figures, which the Treasury 
noted would be difficult to determine for operating assets.
241
 
Use of adjusted tax basis values in the debt-to-equity ratio, however, 
presents several disadvantages that outweigh the advantages.  First, use 
of adjusted tax basis would be inconsistent with judicial opinions, which 
have generally used either fair market value or book value figures.
242
  
Second, adjusted tax basis figures would not represent the economic 
reality of the capitalization of the corporation because adjusted tax basis 
reflects “past tax treatment” of a corporation’s assets and liabilities.
243
  
For instance, some assets, like goodwill or other intangibles, do not have 
an adjusted tax basis, which would distort the calculation.
244
  Finally, in 
commercial lending transactions, the borrower’s tax basis is irrelevant to 
the lender’s consideration of the borrower’s assets and liabilities.
245
  
Because the debt versus equity inquiry is ultimately a question of 
economic reality,
246
 economic reality should be the main focus of the 
Treasury’s regulations.  Adjusted tax basis does not necessarily portray 
the economic reality of a corporation; thus, adjusted tax basis should not 
                                                          
24, 1980).  
 239.   See I.R.C. § 163(j) (2012).   
 240.   But see Philip G. Cohen, Testing for Thin Capitalization Under Section 163(j): A Flawed 
Safe Harbor, 67 TAX LAW. 67, 67–68 (2013) (arguing fair market value, and not book or tax basis, 
is the proper measure in testing thin capitalization for purposes of section 163(j)).  
 241.   Supplementary Information to Proposed Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg. 18,957, 18,959 (Mar. 
24, 1980). 
 242.   See Boyles & Rush, supra note 237, at 68 (“The use of the adjusted basis of the 
corporation’s assets in computing shareholders’ equity may be criticized on the basis that it is 
inconsistent with the existing case law.”).   
 243.   See id. at 69 (stating that adjusted tax basis is “an inaccurate measure of capitalization and 
it has no necessary correlation to economic reality” and is “a reflection of the past tax treatment of 
assets”).  See also Cohen, supra note 240, at 68 (“In many instances, the use of tax basis or book 
value in measuring assets will provide a distorted picture of the borrowing ability of the taxpayer in 
question.”).  
 244.   Boyles & Rush, supra note 237, at 69 (asserting that some assets, such as goodwill, do not 
have adjusted tax basis, which “may substantially distort the equity portion of the debt-equity ratio”).  
See also Cohen, supra note 240, at 67 (noting that most taxpayers would elect to deduct research and 
development expenditures and therefore have no tax basis in these intangible assets).  
 245.  PETER H. BLESSING ET AL., N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N TAX SECTION, REPORT ON CERTAIN 
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS RELATING TO THE SECTION 163(J) EARNINGS STRIPPING RULES 10–11 
(2003), http://old.nysba.org/Content/ContentFolders20/TaxLawSection/TaxReports/1037Report.pdf.  
 246.   See supra notes 137–39 and accompanying text.  
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be used to calculate the debt-to-equity ratio. 
b. Book Value 
While the Treasury’s proposed regulations from the 1980s focused 
on adjusted tax basis, the Ninth Circuit asserts that book value of debt 
and equity should be calculate the debt-to-equity ratio.
247
  Additionally, 
rather than excluding trade payables and third-party debt from the ratio, 
“the total debt-to-equity ratio [comparing the total liabilities to the 
stockholders’ equity] is the appropriate ratio to review in determining 
whether a corporation is too thinly capitalized.”
248
  The Tax Court has 
also used book values in evaluating thin capitalization.
249
 
There are several advantages of using book values to calculate the 
ratio.  Book values are readily available in the corporation’s accounting 
records and are reported on corporate income tax returns,
250
 so utilizing 
book values eliminates the burden of duplicate records required for a fair 
market valuation.  Using book values would also prevent the corporation 
from incurring costs associated with a formal valuation.
251
  Moreover, 
book values, based upon generally accepted accounting principles 
(GAAP), would likely produce more uniformity among taxpayers 
because “credit is ordinarily extended on the basis of certified financial 
statements rather than tax returns.”
252
 
Although there are advantages to using book values as inputs into the 
ratio, book values may not necessarily portray the corporation’s true 
economic capitalization.
253
  The net book value of equity could have little 
to do with a corporation’s ability to achieve third-party lending.
254
  While 
it may appear that the use of fair market values would require duplicate 
records, companies are required to disclose the fair market value of debt, 
but not equity, in the notes to their financial statements.
255
  Further, the 
                                                          
 247.   Bauer v. Comm’r, 748 F.2d 1365, 1369 (9th Cir. 1984).  
 248.   Id.  
 249.   See Smithco Eng’g, Inc. v. Comm’r, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 966, 970 (1984) (using unaudited 
financial statements to calculate high debt/equity ratios to hold that issuer was thinly capitalized).   
 250.   Boyles & Rush, supra note 237, at 70–71.  
 251.   Antoon, supra note 136. 
 252.   Boyles & Rush, supra note 237, at 70.  
 253.   CARNEY, supra note 14, at 95 (“Book value is an accounting artifact that frequently has no 
relationship to the economic value of a business.  The book value of a company is a function of the 
value of its assets as recorded in its accounting records. . . .  [F]requently book value begins to 
deviate from fair market value . . . because the market value of such assets changes.”).   
 254.   Antoon, supra note 136.  
 255.   JCT, supra note 29, at 91 (“From a balance sheet perspective, an instrument classified as 
debt will generally be recorded at historic cost with any accrued but unpaid interest also accounted 
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Tax Court has noted that book values may not include goodwill, which 
should not be ignored in computing the value of a shareholder’s capital 
investment in the corporation.
256
  Because book values do not illustrate 
the economic reality of the corporation, book values should not be used 
to calculate the debt-to-equity ratio. 
c. Fair Market Value 
Considering economic reality, fair market value offers the best 
option to value the inputs into the debt-to-equity ratio.  Fair market value 
is “the price at which the property would change hands between a willing 
buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or 
sell and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts.”
257
  
Economic reality indicates that the courts should look to what a third 
party financial institution would use to loan funds to the corporation.
258
  
In the marketplace, lenders are interested in the debt-to-equity level of a 
borrower based on the fair market value of a corporation because fair 
market value indicates the “intrinsic strength of the business to raise 
capital.”
259
  In fact, in the proposed section 385 regulations from 1980, 
the Treasury noted that fair market values would technically be a more 
accurate figure than adjusted tax basis for the debt-to-equity ratio.
260
  
Furthermore, the majority of courts have taken assets at fair market value 
when valuing the equity interest for the ratio.
261
  For example, the Second 
Circuit asserted: “[I]n the determination of debt-equity ratios, real values 
rather than artificial par and book values should be applied.”
262
 
The fair market value of stockholders’ equity can be computed either 
by netting the fair market value of assets against the fair market value of 
                                                          
for as a liability.  The company, however, will be required to disclose the fair market value of the 
debt in the notes to its financial statements.”).   
 256.   See LaStaiti v. Comm’r, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 511, 520 n.8 (1980) (“[T]he books would not 
necessarily reflect the full value of petitioner’s investment in Associates. . . .  This business 
undoubtedly possessed substantial goodwill, and it cannot be ignored in computing the value of 
petitioner’s capital investment in the corporation.”).  
 257.   Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(c)(2) (as amended in 2008).  
 258.   See supra notes 11–14 and accompanying text.  
 259.   Antoon, supra note 136. 
 260.   Supplementary Information to Proposed Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg. 18,957, 18,959 (1980).  
 261.   See William M. Goldstein, Corporate Indebtedness to Shareholders: “Thin 
Capitalization” and Related Problems, 16 TAX L. REV. 1, 19 (1960) (“The prevailing view seems to 
be that assets are to be taken at fair market value rather than at book value when valuing the equity 
interest in order to compute the [debt-to-equity] ratio.”); McEvoy, supra note 145, at 2 (asserting 
that “the fair market value of assets and liabilities rather than their historical or book values should 
be used” in calculating the debt-to-equity ratio). 
 262.   Kraft Foods Co. v. Comm’r, 232 F.2d 118, 127 (2d Cir. 1956).  
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liabilities or by calculating the fair market value of the issuing 
corporation’s outstanding stock.
263
  Some courts have included intangible 
assets that are not recorded in the accounting records of the corporation 
when calculating fair market value.
264
  Additionally, some courts have 
considered the going-concern value or the goodwill of an established 
business to test the adequacy of a corporation’s capitalization.
265
  In 




However, the main disadvantage of using fair market value is the 
associated costs of a formal valuation.  Requiring small, closely-held 
businesses, which are likely impacted by the debt versus equity issue, to 
pay for a formal valuation of their equity could prove expensive.
267
  Yet, 
the IRS has provided ample guidance for valuation experts of closely-
held corporations, so corporations should be able to seek out valuations 
at a reasonable cost.  Moreover, as discussed above,
268
 recent cases 
                                                          
 263.   See Boyles & Rush, supra note 237, at 70 (“[S]tockholders’ equity is to be computed 
based upon fair market value, . . . [by either calculating] the sum of the fair market values of 
individual assets less the liabilities, . . . [or by calculating] the fair market value of the corporation’s 
outstanding stock.”).   
 264.   See Bulkley Dunton & Co. v. Comm’r, 20 T.C.M. 660, 665 (1961) (considering the 
transfer of a highly reputable business name as an intangible asset caused the entity to not be thinly 
capitalized).  Cf. Plantation Patterns, Inc. v. Comm’r, 462 F.2d 712, 722–23 (5th Cir. 1972), aff’g 29 
T.C.M. (CCH) 817 (1970) (holding that intangible assets should not be included in the debt-to-
equity ratio unless convincing evidence show that the intangible assets have a direct, primary 
relationship to the well-being of the corporation, and that the intangible assets are something more 
than management skills expected of management in any corporation).  
 265.   See Nye v. Comm’r, 50 T.C. 203, 215 (1968) (stating there existed “no reason why either 
the going-concern value or the goodwill of the established business should not be taken into account 
in testing the adequacy of the corporation’s capitalization”); Murphy Logging Co. v. United States, 
378 F.2d 222, 224 (9th Cir. 1967) (considering the intangibles of expectancy of future custom, 
integrity, and reputation for getting things done as extremely important to prevent the corporation 
from being “thinly” capitalized).  
 266.   Cohen, supra note 240, at 85 (“Loans made by third party lenders would take such 
intangibles into consideration.”).   
 267.   See Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237 (outlining “the approach, methods and factors to be 
considered in valuing shares of the capital stock of closely held corporations . . . on which market 
quotations are either unavailable or are of such scarcity that they do not reflect the fair market 
value”).  The relevant factors include:  
(a) [t]he nature of the business and the history of the enterprise from its inception; (b) 
[t]he economic outlook in general and the condition and outlook of the specific industry 
in particular; (c) [t]he book value of the stock and the financial condition of the business; 
(d) [t]he earning capacity of the company; (e) [t]he dividend-paying capacity; (f) 
[w]hether or not the enterprise has goodwill or other intangible value; (g) [s]ales of the 
stock and the size of the block of stock to be valued; [and] (h) [t]he market price of stocks 
of corporations engaged in the same or a similar line of business having their stocks 
actively traded in a free and open market, either on an exchange or over-the-counter. 
Id. 
 268.   See discussion supra Part II.B.2.  
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regarding the debt versus equity issue have involved larger, international 
entities.  If this trend continues, these larger entities should be able to 
afford formal valuations.  Ultimately, “the measure of thin capitalization 




D. Beneficial Effects of Proposing Regulations Under Section 385 
Proposing regulations under section 385 in regards to thin 
capitalization and the debt-to-equity ratio would accrue several 
advantages.  The regulations would decrease litigation, fulfill 
congressional intent, increase predictability for the corporate taxpayer, 
increase consistency throughout the Code as well as with tax laws of 
foreign countries, and incentivize corporate officers to decrease debt in 
corporate capital structures. 
1. Decreased Litigation and Fulfilled Congressional Intent 
The proposed regulations under section 385 regarding thin 
capitalization would decrease litigation on the debt versus equity issue.  
Currently, section 385 and Notice 94-47 merely list possible factors to 
consider in the debt versus equity inquiry.
270
  The ambiguity surrounding 
the governing rule for debt versus equity characterization has resulted in 
decades of incongruent case law among the Tax Court and circuit 
courts.
271
  Additionally, because the debt versus equity analysis involves 
a factual determination, the IRS generally will not provide guidance in 
the form of a letter ruling.
272
  However, the proposed regulations 
discussed above would establish an objective basis to analyze the debt 
versus equity issue.  This objective basis, resulting in less ambiguity for 
the corporate taxpayer and the IRS, would promote judicial economy by 
decreasing litigation on this issue. 
                                                          
 269.   See Cohen, supra note 240, at 87–88.   
 270.   See discussion supra Part II.A.3.  
 271.   See discussion supra Part II.B.1.  
 272.   Rev. Proc. 2015-3, 2015-1 I.R.B. 129, § 4.02(1). 
Although it is generally inappropriate for the Service to issue a letter ruling on whether 
an interest in a corporation is stock or indebtedness, there may be instances in which the 
Service may issue a letter ruling.  For example, the Service may issue a letter ruling with 
respect to an instrument issued by a domestic corporation if (i) the taxpayer believes that 
the facts strongly support the classification of the instrument as stock and (ii) the taxpayer 
can demonstrate that there are unique and compelling reasons to justify the issuance of a 
letter ruling. 
Id.  
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In addition, the proposed regulations would fulfill congressional 
intent.  In legislative history from the codification of section 385, the 
Senate Finance Committee noted: “[I]t would be desirable to provide 
rules for distinguishing debt from equity in the variety of contexts in 
which [the distinction between debt and equity] can arise.”
273
  
Accordingly, Congress authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to 
prescribe regulations.
274
  Treasury regulations are particularly persuasive 
when “supported by declarations of congressional intent.”
275
  
Furthermore, the Treasury frequently and efficiently issues regulations, 
which foregoes the moderate pace of Congress.
276
  Therefore, the 
Treasury’s proposing regulations under section 385 would fulfill 
congressional intent. 
2. Increased Predictability 
In addition to decreasing litigation and fulfilling congressional intent, 
proposing section 385 regulations involving thin capitalization would 
also increase predictability for the corporate taxpayer.  Commentators 
agree that the most significant problem with the multifactor debt versus 
equity test is its unpredictability.
277
  In general, the Code is considered 
one of the most “extensive, confusing, and unpredictable areas of 
law.”
278
  Specifically, the lack of regulations under section 385 makes 
debt versus equity issues difficult to analyze because of the inconsistent 
case law and infrequent pronouncements from the IRS.
279
  As discussed 
above,
280
 the circuit courts do not agree on a particular list of factors for 
the debt versus equity analysis.  Thus, the circuits’ multifactor tests are 
“similar but not uniform.”
281
  One commentator noted: “In practice the 
result of the debt-equity factors is not to provide a solution to the 
                                                          
 273.   S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 2170 (1969).  
 274.   See id.  
 275.   United States v. Stapf, 375 U.S. 118, 127 n.11 (1963).  
 276.   Jason Quinn, Comment, Being Punished for Obeying the Rules: Corporate Tax Planning 
and the Overly Broad Economic Substance Doctrine, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1041, 1076 (2008).  
 277.   Greenaway & Marion, supra note 24, at 80–81.   
 278.   Quinn, supra note 276, at 1073.  
 279.   Debt v. Equity Considered in Recent Non-Binding Issuances, 19 J. TAX’N F. INSTITUTION 
59, 64 (2005) (noting the “heterogeneous case law and the piecemeal nature of IRS pronouncements 
in the area”).  See also Greenaway & Marion, supra note 24, at 74 (“[The] classic multifactor test . . . 
is unpredictable.  It uses some factors that are hard if not impossible to measure.  Other factors offer 
a veneer of objectivity but no baseline against which to measure.  Finally, there is no agreed way for 
practitioners and judges to weigh one factor against another or all the factors together.”).   
 280.   See discussion supra Part II.B.1.  
 281.   Cohen, supra note 240, at 67.  
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problem but rather to foster uncertainty.  Flexibility of a rule always 
favors the IRS more than taxpayers because most taxpayers are scared by 




Predictability would result from the objective calculation of the debt-
to-equity ratio to determine if the borrowing corporation is thinly 
capitalized.
283
  While other debt versus equity factors require high levels 
of subjectivity from the courts,
284
 thin capitalization—determined by the 
debt-to-equity ratio—offers objectivity to analysis of the issue.  
Therefore, the corporate taxpayer would be able to rely on the proposed 
regulations, which would utilize fair market values to calculate the debt-
to-equity ratio.  If the corporate taxpayer’s debt-to-equity ratio is 
reasonable for its industry, then the taxpayer should be able to predict 
that the IRS, as well as the courts, would support its interest deductions. 
Furthermore, section 385 regulations would provide the corporate 
taxpayer with a defined framework on which to rely because final 
Treasury regulations consistent with the corresponding statute have the 
force of law.
285
  The Code gives the Secretary of the Treasury broad 
authority to prescribe regulations for enforcement of the Code.
286
  As a 
result, “Treasury regulations must be sustained unless unreasonable and 
plainly inconsistent”
287
 with the Code.  However, the proposed 
regulations must be adopted in final form to have full legal effect.
288
  
Here, section 385 regulations would be considered legislative 
regulations,
289
 which are governed by the Administrative Procedure Act 
                                                          
 282.   Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., Pepsico and Debt Equity, 138 TAX NOTES 111 (2013).  
 283.   See discussion supra Part II.B.3.  
 284.   See discussion supra Part III.A.   
 285.   See Deshler Hotel Co. v. Busey, 36 F. Supp. 392, 395 (S.D. Ohio 1941), aff’d, 130 F.2d 
187 (6th Cir. 1942) (asserting that the Treasury regulation in question, “in so far as it is authorized 
by the terms of the act, must be deemed to have been given legislative approval, and to that extent, it 
is to be considered as a part of the law”).  See also Quinn, supra note 276, at 1079 (“If the taxpayer 
cannot determine the scope of the standards by which his actions will be judged, he cannot tailor his 
actions to conform to the law.”).  
 286.   I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2012) (“[T]he Secretary shall prescribe all needful rules and regulations 
for the enforcement of this title, including all rules and regulations as may be necessary by reason of 
any alteration of law in relation to internal revenue.”).  
 287.   United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 557 (1973) (quoting Comm’r v. S. Tex. Lumber 
Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948)). 
 288.   I.R.S. Chief Couns. Notice CC-2003-014 (May 8, 2003) (“Proposed regulations have no 
legal effect unless and until they are adopted.”).  
 289.   See LEANDRA LEDERMAN & STEPHEN W. MAZZA, TAX CONTROVERSIES: PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE 31 (3d ed. 2009) (noting that legislative regulations, distinguished from interpretive 
regulations, are “released under an express delegation of Congressional authority in the particular 
Code section they address”).  See also I.R.C. § 385(a) (“The Secretary is authorized to prescribe 
such regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to determine whether an interest in a 
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(APA).
290
  The APA requires a thirty-day notice and comment period 




Once finalized, the proposed regulations would be consistent with 
the Code for several reasons.  First, the debt-to-equity ratio is one of the 
five factors listed in section 385,
292
 so further defining this factor would 
be consistent with the congressional intent of section 385.
293
  Second, the 
proposed regulations would not define thin capitalization as the only 
factor to the analysis.  Rather, the proposed regulations would define thin 
capitalization as a principal factor for debt versus equity 
characterization.
294
  Thus, the Treasury would have the option to set forth 
other factors to be taken into account for the debt versus equity analysis 
in accordance with section 385(b).
295
 
3. Increased Consistency 
In addition to increasing predictability, the proposed regulations 
would also increase consistency among court rulings, within the Code 
itself, and with tax laws of foreign countries.  First, with objective 
guidance from the proposed regulations, courts would be less likely to 
subjectively arrive at their conclusions.  Courts are tempted to “bend any 
available tool” to disallow disproportionate tax benefits, so courts are 
likely to disallow interest deductions on purported debt.
296
  In addition, 
over time, courts have been inconsistent in their calculation of the debt-
to-equity ratio.
297
  Several courts have used book value,
298
 while others 
have used fair market value.
299
  Because the proposed regulations would 
establish that fair market value is the standard for calculating the debt-to-
                                                          
corporation is to be treated for purposes of this title as stock or indebtedness (or as in part stock and 
in part indebtedness).”). 
 290.   5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).  
 291.   See id. § 553(b)(3), (d).  
 292.   See I.R.C. § 385(b)(3).  
 293.   See S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 2169–76 (1969).  
 294.   See discussion supra Part III.C.  
 295.   See I.R.C. § 385(b) (“The regulations prescribed under this section shall set forth factors 
which are to be taken into account in determining with respect to a particular factual situation 
whether a debtor-creditor relationship exists or a corporation-shareholder relationship exists.”).  
 296.   See Adams, supra note 87.  
 297.   See Liflans Corp. v. United States, 390 F.2d 965, 969 (Ct. Cl. 1968) (noting that the 
plaintiff’s debt-to-equity ratio depended “on when computed and whether the book value or the 
market value of the assets is used”).  
 298.   See discussion supra Part III.C.2.b.   
 299.   See discussion supra Part III.C.2.c.  
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equity ratio, this ambiguity would be resolved. 
Second, the proposed regulations would increase consistency within 
the Code.  Several provisions of the Code utilize fair market value, such 
as in the calculation of initial tax basis, and capital gains and losses.
300
  
Similarly, the proposed regulations would use fair market value to 
calculate the issuing corporation’s debt and equity.  Thus, the proposed 
regulations would increase consistency between section 385 and other 
sections of the Code that utilize fair market value. 
Some may argue that using fair market value for the debt-to-equity 
ratio, rather than increase consistency, would decrease consistency.  
Section 163(j) uses adjusted tax basis, not fair market value, to 
implement a 1.5 to 1 safe harbor debt-to-equity ratio.
301
  As a result, the 
proposed regulations may decrease consistency between sections 385 and 
163(j).  However, some commentators assert that section 163(j) should 
use fair market value rather than adjusted tax basis in its calculation.
302
  
After balancing the arguments, fair market value appears to be the better 
approach to increase consistency within the Code. 
Finally, the proposed regulations would increase consistency 
between the Code and tax laws of other countries because the proposed 
regulations will reach a broader base of corporate taxpayers.  In the mid-
1990s, less than one-third of European countries imposed thin 
capitalization rules.
303
  By 2005, three-fifths of European countries had 
imposed such rules.
304
  These anti-abuse provisions restrict “interest 




Tax penalties are usually enforced if the domestic corporation’s debt-
to-equity ratio is above a fixed ratio, labeled as a safe haven or safe 
harbor.
306
  For instance, in Australia, the interest deduction for 
indebtedness is denied when an entity’s worldwide debt-to-equity ratio 
exceeds 3 to 1.
307
  Similarly, in Japan, “when liabilities exceed three 
times the capital held by the foreign controlling shareholder, the amount 
                                                          
 300.   See Cohen, supra note 240, at 67.   
 301.   See I.R.C. § 163(j) (2012).  
 302.   See generally Cohen, supra note 240, at 67 (arguing that fair market value, and not book 
or tax basis, is the proper measure in testing thin capitalization for purposes of section 163(j)).  
 303.   Thiess Buettner et al., The Impact of Thin-Capitalization Rules on the Capital Structure of 
Multinational Firms, 96 J. PUB. ECON. 930, 930 (2012).  
 304.   Id.   
 305.   Id. at 931.  
 306.   Id.  
 307.   JCT, supra note 29, at 95.  
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of interest payable on the excess amount is not deductible.”
308
 
In the United States, section 163(j) is cited as the U.S. “thin 
capitalization” safe harbor rule.
309
  Yet, section 163(j) applies to a narrow 
subset of U.S. corporate taxpayers that have a debt-to-equity ratio in 
excess of 1.5 to 1, pay “disqualified interest,” and have “excess interest 
expense.”
310
  However, section 385 applies to all corporate taxpayers.
311
  
If the proposed regulations are finalized, then the U.S. thin capitalization 
rules would include not only section 163(j) but also section 385.  
Therefore, the proposed regulations under section 385 would increase 
consistency between U.S. tax laws and those of other countries. 
4. Corporations Incentivized to Decrease Debt in Capital Structures 
In addition to decreasing litigation and increasing predictability and 
consistency, proposing regulations under section 385 would also 
incentivize corporations to decrease debt in their capital structures.  
Corporations generally seek to support business at the lowest cost of 
capital.
312
  Because of the advantageous interest deduction associated 
with debt instruments, corporate taxpayers have a strong incentive to 
treat cash advances from corporate parents or individual shareholders as 
debt.
313
  The proposed regulations would likely change how corporations 
finance their capital structures.  Rather than taking advantage of 
inconsistent case law to increase debt in their capital structures,
314
 
corporate taxpayers would be cautious of a capital structure with 
excessive debt because the debt-to-equity ratio would be an established, 
principal factor in the analysis.  Indeed, at least one empirical study 
shows that rules limiting thin capitalization change a taxpaying 
corporation’s behavior because the rules reduce a corporation’s tax 
incentive to use debt with a closely-held affiliate.
315
 
                                                          
 308.   Id.   
 309.   See Buettner et al., supra note 303, at 932. 
 310.   See I.R.C. § 163(j) (2012).  
 311.   See I.R.C. § 385.  Section 385 is in Subchapter C, entitled “Corporate Distributions and 
Adjustments.” 
 312.   JCT, supra note 29, at 64 (“A business (the issuer of debt or equity) typically wishes to 
obtain capital at the lowest cost.”).  
 313.   See discussion supra Part II.A.1.  
 314.   Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: Toward Straightforward Section 385 Guidance, 65 TAX 
NOTES 664 (1994) (containing the statement that the lack of section 385 regulations “embolden[s] 
taxpayers to push the limits of their interpretation of the case law”).  
 315.   See Buettner et al., supra note 303, at 937 (“[O]ur results indicate that thin-capitalization 
rules can effectively reduce the tax-incentive for internal debt and, thus, curb tax planning by 
multinational firms . . . .”).  
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Since 2008, there have been efforts to deleverage—or decrease debt 
within—business structures because excessive debt is blamed as the 
main cause of the 2008 financial crisis.
316
  Because the proposed 
regulations regarding thin capitalization would impact the behavior of 
corporate taxpayers, the proposed regulations would aid in the efforts for 
corporations to deleverage their capital structures to avoid another 
financial crisis. 
In addition, in September 2014, the IRS issued Notice 2014-52 in 
regards to corporate inversions.
317
  In these transactions, a U.S. entity 
merges with a foreign company and then changes its place of domicile to 
the country in which the foreign company is located.
318
  Such corporate 
inversions are attractive to U.S. corporations because of foreign 
countries’ lower tax rates.
319
  As a result of an inversion, a U.S. 
corporation may issue debt to its foreign parent to deduct interest.
320
  
Regarding this possibility, Notice 2014-52 states: 
The Treasury Department and the IRS expect to issue additional 
guidance to further limit inversion transactions . . . .  In particular, the 
Treasury Department and the IRS are considering guidance to address 
strategies that avoid U.S. tax on U.S. operations by shifting or 
“stripping” U.S.-source earnings to lower-tax jurisdictions, including 
through intercompany debt.  Comments are requested regarding the 
approaches such guidance should take.
321
 
To address corporate inversions, lawmakers have considered section 
385 regulations, which would limit the amount of debt a company could 
                                                          
 316.   See Greenaway & Marion, supra note 24, at 93–94.  
Some consider the [Internal Revenue] Service’s work on debt-equity cases to be part of 
the larger regulatory effort towards deleveraging the U.S. economy.  Excessive debt was 
blamed as a main culprit behind the 2008 financial crisis and ensuing great recession. . . .  
With the “deleveraging” conventional wisdom firmly planted in the minds of the 
informed public and policymakers, it would not be surprising to find the [Internal 
Revenue] Service—with the benefit of hindsight—attacking what proved to be overly 
optimistic debt financing arrangements. 
Id.   
 317.   I.R.S. Notice 2014-52, 2014-42 I.R.B. 712.  
 318.   Maureen Farrell & Damian Paletta, Obama Explores Tax-Code Weapons in Inversion-
Merger Fight, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 8, 2014, 12:09 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/obama-explores-
tax-code-weapons-in-inversion-merger-fight-1407458279.   
 319.   Id.  
 320.   See J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. et al., Getting Serious About Cross-Border Earnings Stripping: 
Establishing an Analytical Framework, 93 N.C. L. REV. 673, 678–80 (2015) (“A major reason for 
U.S. MNEs [multinational enterprises] to invert is to create large amounts of debt owed to foreign 
related parties and then to erode the U.S. income tax base by means of deductible interest payments 
on that debt, a maneuver included under the rubric of earnings stripping.”).  
 321.   I.R.S. Notice 2014-52, 2014-42 I.R.B. 712.   
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use for tax deductions.
322
  Here, the proposed regulations regarding thin 
capitalization would aid in the effort to decrease corporate inversions 
because the proposed regulations add objectivity to the facts and 
circumstances test.  If a corporate taxpayer is considering a corporate 
inversion under the status quo, the corporate officers would likely think 
that the corporation could support its position due to the wide flexibility 
of the debt versus equity factors test.  However, under the proposed 
regulations, the corporate officers would be forced to focus on economic 
reality by honing in on the debt-to-equity ratio.  As a result, the proposed 
regulations would incentivize corporations to decrease debt in their 
capital structures. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The debt versus equity treatment of cash advances between 
shareholders and a corporation has caused decades of litigation, resulting 
in inconsistent rulings and a plethora of considered factors.  Courts 
should look to thin capitalization with the associated debt-to-equity ratio 
to objectively evaluate the economic reality of the corporation’s financial 
condition. 
To fulfill Congress’ intent in enacting section 385, the Treasury 
should propose regulations to provide more guidance to corporate 
taxpayers regarding thin capitalization.  The regulations should not 
impose a safe harbor rule because a reasonable debt-to-equity ratio in 
one industry may be unreasonable in another industry.  Rather, the 
regulations should establish the calculation of the debt-to-equity ratio 
based upon fair market value of the issuing corporation’s liabilities and 
shareholders’ equity.  Such an approach is comparable to the approach of 
third party lenders. 
Section 385 regulations regarding thin capitalization and the debt-to-
equity ratio would solve many shortcomings of the status quo.  
Treasury’s guidance would provide more certainty to taxpayers and 
would promote judicial economy in focusing on the economic reality of 
the situation rather than an endless list of factors, several of which are 
irrelevant in the current financial marketplace.  In addition, Treasury’s 
                                                          
 322.   Andrew Velarde, Debt Reclassification or Interest Limits Possible for Inversions. (Section 
7874 – Expatriated Entities and Foreign Parents), 2014 TAX NOTES TODAY 210-1 (2014).  See also 
Andrew Velarde, Targeted 385 Stripping Guidance Is Path of Least Resistance, TAX ANALYSTS 
(Dec. 29, 2014), http://www.taxanalysts.com/www/features.nsf/Features/811E7B26FEF241AE85 
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creating regulations regarding corporate inversions under section 385 rather than section 163(j)). 
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guidance would increase predictability and consistency.  The proposed 
regulations would also incentivize corporations to de-leverage their 
businesses. 
Ultimately, the proposed regulations would bring to the forefront 
thin capitalization, a principal factor in the debt versus equity analysis.  
Thin capitalization and the debt-to-equity ratio focus on the economic 
reality of the corporation’s capital structure.  As international financing 
continues to increase, Treasury’s guidance on these issues would 
increase predictability for the taxpayer and consistency for the lawmaker. 
 
